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The Persian Gulf Crisis
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18309 |
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EDITORIAL
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10 / 1990 |
788 Words |
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Morton A. Kaplan
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President Bush has moved with consummate skill in the Persian Gulf crisis. He has organized a virtually universal combine, including the Soviet Union, against Saddam Hussein. The swift dispatch of American military to Saudi Arabia has closed the window on a successful Iraqi strike against Saudi Arabia, except at a price the Iraqi strongman is extremely unlikely to be willing to pay. The movement of Arab forces south of the Kuwaiti border has convicted Iraq of the “crime” of bringing Western military forces into the Arab area. The facts that Iraq depends on external sources for 80 percent of its food and that the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein depends upon the ruthless use of force to maintain internal control place great pressure on him to end the crisis.
Saddam Hussein made two major mistakes. The first was to underestimate the willingness of the United States to intervene subsequent to the Iraqi fait accompli in Kuwait. The second was to reject the territorial and oil deal that the Arab conference in Cairo offered. But despite the mistakes made by Saddam Hussein and the professional performance by President Bush, the situation has not been entirely one-sided.
Saddam Hussein's failure to anticipate the American response may have been a product of our appeasement of Iraq. Our criticism of his gassing of Iranians and of Iraqi Kurds did not lead to any lessening in our supply of military equipment or economic credit to Iraq. No doubt, we did not want Iraq to lose to the Iranians because of the instability this might have produced in the Middle East. But our failure to punish him to deter future horrendous acts was not to our credit. When Iraqi Kurds in the United States picketed the Iraqi Embassy to protest the unprovoked gas attacks upon their brethren, Iraqi officials gathered at the embassy doors to ridicule them. This uncivilized spectacle far surpassed anything that Hitler's embassies did during World War II and at a minimum should have provoked a declaration that these despicable officials were persona non grata. And yet, even after the war ended, we continued to provide support to Iraq.
Bush had ample legal grounds for declaring a blockade of the Persian Gulf without UN approval. However, was it wise to do so without seeking approval and before demonstration of the necessity of doing so? We had received admirable cooperation from the Security Council. All proposed resolutions had passed. Perhaps we shall have recovered from this gaffe well before this editorial appears in print. But I still do not see why we moved so precipitously.
Saudi Arabia has agreed to increase its oil production to help make up for the Iraqi and Kuwaiti shortfall. But Saudi suggestions that we begin to use our strategic reserves were uncalled for. It is the Saudi regime that is being preserved at great cost to the United States. Surely it can be made clear to them that the regime's responsibilities to the United States are not being adequately fulfilled.
Although most recent Iraqi moves - such as the return to Iran of the disputed territories on August 15 - demonstrate the weakness of Iraq, even a blockade will not be as effective as we wish. There is no way, for instance, to prevent Kurds from moving sheep across the border from Turkey to Iraq, although the price they will demand will be extremely high in terms of gold and weapons. Unless we are extremely careful in our treatment of shipments to and through Aqaba, we can
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