Summit photos often have more symbolism than first meets the eye. The publicity photos from the early annual Seven-Power Economic summits invariably showed the Japanese prime minister stuck on the edge of the main group. By the second half of the 1980s Japanese prime ministers were edging nearer the middle, but at this July's Houston summit Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu appeared center stage, cracking joke. Kaifu's new self-confidence and informal ranking reflected his fellow countrymen's own feelings about themselves. Thanks in no small part to Kaifu himself, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party had recovered from 18 months of political paralysis; in addition, the economy was undergoing a sustained boom, and tortuous negotiations with the United States over trade barriers had reached a degree of resolution. Japan seemed reengaged in international affairs, and abroad expectations were raised about more positive foreign policy initiatives. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resurrected all the old hesitancy and circumspection in Japanese diplomacy and again raised doubts about Japan's contribution to the maintenance of international order.
To the world outside, Japan is still seen as a kind of paradox: a massive economic power, justly renowned for its dynamism and innovation, but yet, in many ways, faltering and, at times, even immobile in political and security affairs. Japan is a major overseas investor and trader (with a trade surplus that has, in recent years, even exceeded in value the total GNP of some European countries), the world's leading creditor, and the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA), having just overtaken the United States. This has inevitably given the Japanese a great deal of confidence in their economy - and its ability to survive oil price rises such as those that occurred after the Middle East crisis broke out - but this has not been translated into any confidence in the means of handling, or even the desirability of developing, a higher political profile in international affairs.
During the 1980's, the Japanese government began to characterize its position as “a member of the West with its roots in Asia.” This was an attempt to reformulate the traditional dichotomy: post-World War II Japan is politically and economically part of the West and geographically and culturally part of Asia. Yet ironically, for much of its postwar history Japan as felt itself rather isolated, a full member of neither the West nor Asia. This feeling, moreover, has often been reciprocated by Japan's Western and Asian partners.
In Europe, West Germany was brought back into the new postwar European order through its membership in the European Community and NATO. Japan, however, remained dependent on one bilateral relationship, with the United States, while no settled economic or political order emerged in neighboring East Asia. Although the Japan-U.S, relationship is no longer as asymmetrical as it was even a decade ago, the high degree of economic and politico-security interdependence has meant that Japan's international behavior has been colored by a strong element of bilateralism - the need to manage its relationship with the United States. This has caused resentment and misunderstanding among both Europeans and Asians.
The postwar Euro-Japanese relationship has been relatively distant and largely confined to economic interactions. In the process, a certain duality has emerged in European perceptions of Japan. On the one hand, lingering and often bitter wartime memories
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