China's current instability makes it fashionable for analysts to devise short and long-tern scenarios of China's future. But meaningful prognostication must reflect the social and political cleavages that halted the reforms in fall 1988, when the pendulum of power swung to the conservatives, and the historical trends that framed the tragedy of June 4, 1989. No doubt, June 4 created new fissures, placing a blood debt on the heads of those who advocated a violent crackdown. But the Old Guard who wield power, the second tier of leaders who implement the conservative line, and any future leaders must all deal with China's economic, social, and political problems. These problems, as well as the current power structure within China, will determine the makeup of any new ruling group.
These issues include the following:
· the task of maintaining national unity in the face of regional variations;
· conflicts among the public, private, and rural collective sectors;
· the degree of marketization of economy, price reform, and the corruption inherent in a "dual economy";
· demands for a civil society that, in the absence of new political institutions, generate a" participation crisis";
· the need for a value system to fill the moral vacuum;
· an appropriate role for the Communist Party within society and the military within the polity;
· an entrepreneurial class of children of high-ranking cadres;
· two succession crises; and
· a balanced relationship with the outside world.
Mao Zedong knew that successful Chinese governments balance regional interests. Yet under the "opening to the outside world," coastal regions developed faster than inland areas. Guangdong Province prospered by exporting the r resources of hinterland provinces. A shrinking central budget limited transfer payments to poorer areas. The current regime has demanded more money from rich provinces, creating animosity among the governments ruling 200 million coastal inhabitants.
But will any post-Deng group hold the country together and successfully allocate resources among the provinces and between the central government and the provinces? A more federalist National People's Congress, with specified regional representation, or regional representation on a more federalist Politburo, may successfully mediate these interests. Otherwise, centrifugal forces, including increasing separatist tendencies in minority regions, could significantly weaken party leadership.
China's leaders must resolve the contradictions between the plan and the market and between an inefficient urban state sector and a growing rural industrial sector. Reformers believed that only privatizing state enterprises would make them
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