Afghanistan has once again reappeared as a small blip on the screen of media coverage. The current moderate level of interest has been generated by the U.S. government's announcement that differences between Washington and Moscow over the nature of a final settlement have been narrowed.
Those differences had centered on the character of the Afghan government, with Moscow insisting on continued communist control and Washington asking for a more genuine, representative Afghan government. The bone of contention, on the surface at least, has been the issue of elections and the continuance in power of current Moscow puppet, Najibullah. Recent "progress," it would appear, was due to Washington's willingness to "compromise" and allow a continued role for Najibullah in exchange for more genuine elections.
Whether Najibullah continues in office, is permanently barred from it, or is ultimately allowed to run for president in internationally supervised elections may at best be peripheral to the central issue: Who will control Afghanistan? With regard to the latter Moscow has not budged, and even Soviet willingness to dispense with Najibullah would not affect that fundamental fact. Communist control is deeply entrenched in the various cities of Afghanistan through the Afghan version of the Soviet KGB, the WAD. Soviet "advisers" permeate the entire governmental structure, with the Afghan leader not even allowed to give interviews to foreign journalists without the presence of Soviet notetakers. Soviet aid to Afghanistan amounts to some $4 billion a year. Soviet military support continues, including air sorties and troops manning missile batteries. It is also entirely possible that Moscow, having raised the importance of Najibullah's presence or absence as a key to settlement by refusing to abandon him, may then declare him expendable after all, and portray such a turnaround as a major concession.
The modalities of elections, the personalities of leaders, and legal-structural considerations more generally form only part of the total picture. The current fixation in the diplomatic maneuvering with just such a narrow portion of the whole runs the risk of placing the United States in a losing position from which it will be difficult to later escape.
In order to fully assess that larger whole, and to draw conclusions as to an appropriate U.S. policy, it is necessary to broaden the scope of inquiry to include three essential elements: (1) the earlier negotiating history, culminating in the Geneva Accords in 1988, which are but a reflection of another important element-(2) who wants what and why in Afghanistan, and finally (3) the situation on the ground resulting from the actions of interested parties over the last 10 years.
The Geneva Accords
The Geneva Accords had been touted as ushering in the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, a triumph of U.S. policy, and a corresponding revelation of Moscow's failure. The Soviet Union, it was said, had finally recognized the uselessness of its Afghan adventure and had decided to cut its losses by withdrawing its troops from that country. Since, it was said, no communist regime could exist without the protection of Soviet troops, the Kabul puppet regime would collapse within weeks of the troop withdrawal, and the Afghan resistance would then be able to seize
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