As Deng Xiaoping turns 86 this August, Americans remain uncertain: Is he still China's champion of reform and modernization? Or just a "butcher of Beijing?"
For 10 years, we admired hope for the future. Now, after the tragedy at Tiananmen, many view Deng as China's past - one in a cabal of octogenarians who ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to clear Tiananmen Square by force.
As history begins its judgment of Deng and as we assess the prospects for Sino-American relations in the coming post Deng era, we must put Deng, the causes and consequences of Tiananmen, and the challenges and opportunities facing the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in perspective.
I first met Deng in October 1981. His 1978 comeback had marked the end of the Cultural Revolution and the defeat of the "Gang of Four.” It represented the beginning of a new effort to modernize China. From his animated analysis, it was clear Deng had a grand strategy to deal with China's most compelling imperative. In the long-standing historical debate, Deng sided with those who said China should modernize by interacting with the world. He said China was backward because China had been closed.
Defining a link between reform and opening (gaige kaifang), Deng said China would invigorate its domestic economy by expanding and strengthening its outside ties. To provide the period of peace necessary for development, Deng orchestrated an outward looking Chinese foreign policy based on normalized Sino-American relations.
For 10 years, Deng's plan worked at home and abroad. His reforms doubled China's GNP. They raised the standard of living for many. Colorful, stylish dress replaced drab, uniform Mao suits. People began speaking their minds.
Indeed, for a decade, we lauded the achievements of the straight-talking, bridge-playing, chain-smoking champion of China's Four Modernizations. Twice Time magazines Man of the Year, Deng was known as the pragmatic little dynamo bent on making Mao's centrally planned economy more market-oriented and on bringing outside capital, technology, and techniques to China.
These changes were good for the Chinese people, for regional stability and prosperity, and for the global balance. They were good for the United States. This was the way reform was supposed to work.
Yet, inherent in China's decision-making system and Deng's reforms were two persistent contradictions, which developed into fatal flaws.
The first difficulty Deng faced was the periodic inability of China's decision-making system to arbitrate personal power struggles and conflicting visions of China's future without resorting to violence. This is the violence that erupts when rapid, dislocating changes shake traditional societies. It is the violence endemic to governmental systems where rule is often by individuals, not law, where plays for power in the inner sanctums are played out on the streets in public campaigns.
Ironically, Deng's second dilemma derived in some ways
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