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The Cold War Endgame in Central America
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17989 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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5 / 1990 |
2,399 Words |
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Tom Cox
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Longstanding East-West tensions in Central America are melting away at a stunning pace. At Malta, President Bush cited Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas (totaling more than $2 billion under Mikhail Gorbachev) and the export of revolution by Cuba and Nicaragua as "the single most disruptive factor in the [U.S.-Soviet] relationship.” By recognizing Violeta Chamorro as the legitimate victor in a "free and fair election" in Nicaragua, however, the Soviet Union has taken a giant stride toward transforming the planned June meeting between Bush and Gorbachev into the most successful superpower summit in the postwar era.
Meanwhile, Hungary and Bulgaria broke from the socialist bloc to provide the decisive votes for passage of a UN measure condemning Cuban human rights abuses.
Yet, although Gorbachev is clearly hard-pressed to spend an estimated $10 billion - more than one-fourth of Moscow's total hard currency earnings - on military expeditions in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, he has not given up on any of them. The recent Soviet delivery of six Soviet MiG-29 fighter-bombers to Cuba provides a clear indication Moscow's reluctance to relinquish its status as an aggressive superpower.
Soviet support for these Third World outposts is no longer a peripheral Cold War concern; it is the leading issue on the superpower agenda. The rising momentum of democracy east of Berlin and the declining prospect military conflict in Europe only magnify the strategic importance of Central America. As long as Marxist FMLN terrorists threaten El Salvador's fragile democracy and Cuba serves as a Soviet aircraft carrier in the Caribbean, Cold war tensions will remain.
Unfortunately, U.S. containment strategy in the region has traditionally focused on averting disaster rather than on achieving decisive victory in the battle against political instability and economic stagnation. U.S. geopolitical priorities emphasizing Central Europe and the Middle East have relegated Central America to a peripheral role in U.S. foreign policy.
The Reagan Doctrine succeeded in realigning U.S. strategy in the region toward a more assertive posture. The 1985 U.S. trade embargo raised the cost of Sandinista subversion of neighboring countries and weakened Daniel Otega's control over domestic opposition in Nicaragua. Moreover, by supporting freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, President Reagan put the Soviets on notice that their free ride for global subversion was over. The policy was a bargain. Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas U.S. military aid to the Contras
A more assertive U.S. effort to support democratic development in the region is reaping significant benefits. Anti-Yanqui rhetoric by public by public officials notwithstanding, Latin American citizens have welcome U.S. help in fulfilling their democratic aspirations in Grenada, Panama, and Nicaragua. An unprecedented opportunity now exists to promote market-oriented development in Central America. Liberation theology, which equates the socialist model with economic development, is irreparably damaged. Pope John Paul II, by declaring (in 1987) individual economic initiative to be "an inalienable right" and urging citizens of the region to "make the greatest possible use of private enterprise," is now the pope of economic liberty. Newly elected leaders, including
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