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Why We Need a Concert of Europe Now


Article # : 17857 

Section : CURRENT ISSUES
Issue Date : 3 / 1990  565 Words
Author : Morton A. Kaplan

       The article by Z and the opposition to it are manifestations of the old Washington syndrome of either/or thinking. The United States has a genuine interest in preventing anarchy in Soviet Union, which involves help to Mikhail Gorbachev, but it also has an interest in seeing that this help is not used to prevent or delay necessary change. It needs to find a modus within which these twin objectives can be pursued.
       
       My proposal in the February issue of THE WORLD & I (Page 48) for a Concert of Europe that would include the United States and the Soviet Union becomes even more urgent as events unfold in the Soviet Union. Matters in Lithuania are coming to a head. If we support independence unilaterally, in the absence of a Concert in which the Soviet Union plays an equal role we are interfering in Russian politics in an unacceptable and dangerous way. The mass unraveling of the Soviet system could set off unpredictable and very violent currents. Yet, we have no alternative except to favor independence for Lithuania, however much we may downplay this diplomatically.
       
       Discussions within a Concert could produce a joint guarantee that Lithuania, for instance, has an unconditional right to independence and, at the same time, could lead to collective attempts to persuade the Lithuanians to delay the choice of independence for five years, during which time some form of a relationship with Russia and the other republics could be explored.
       
       The case of the Baltic states, which were incorporated into the Soviet Union after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, could be distinguished from the cases of the other Russian republics, which were part of Russia at the time of the Revolution. Still, the Concert could agree that some form of federal or confederal devolution, and possibly independence, eventually is required in these cases also; and it is likely that Gorbachev would welcome this assistance.
       
       The existence of a trans-European political consensus might provide time for orderly change and reassurance of general support for such change. This forum might also provide a politically acceptable framework for linking assistance to guaranteed change in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has already accepted multiple parties in principle. The degree of political support the Concert extends to Russia could be linked to the degree of democratization and devolution in the Soviet Union.
       
       In the economic realm, the degree of economic support should not be linked to terms such as capitalism or socialism. That would be an unacceptable intrusion on the democratic decisions within the Soviet Union. It can reasonably be linked, however, to the degree of market reform and entrepreneurial independence, as the greater efficiency of these is no longer subject to question. And those who provide financial assistance, which is always a burden, have a right to link such assistance to its effective use.
       
       The United States has an important interest in helping Gorbachev and the Russian reformers. It has an equally great interest in providing such help in a way that makes success possible. We have no interest in standing aside while Gorbachev sinks when we can provide a framework that provides an incentive for him to succeed and the possibility that this might occur. In the process, we also could build a better and more durable world order, particularly if we also acted to promote a Global
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