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Democracy or Death in China
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15987 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
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7 / 1989 |
2,504 Words |
| Author
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Pei Minxin
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Few Chinese leaders--or anyone else--foresaw that massive student demonstrations for democracy would erupt and continue in China. The event that ostensibly triggered these unprecedented demonstrations was the April 15 death of Hu Yaobang, the former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Hu was dismissed two years ago for his liberal policies and his refusal to suppress the prodemocracy student demonstrations that shocked China at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987.
There are two superficial similarities between this spring's demonstrations and those staged in the winter of 1986-87. First, on both occasions, the principal organizers and participants were students and--as we have learned--were actually the same students. Second, the call for democracy and freedom was the chief demand both today and two years ago; however, the differences between these two waves of demonstrations were not only qualitative but far-reaching.
The prodemocracy demonstrations of 1986-87 took place during the heyday of economic reform; the economic situation of China was, generally speaking, very good. Annual growth was good, and inflation was kept low. Corruption was growing but had not become the principal issue. Although the organizers intended the demonstrations that first broke out in Hofei and Shanghai to show support for China's paramount leader, the participating students sported banners that read, "We support Deng Xiaoping and the reformers." Aside from calls for democracy and freedom, few other specific demands were raised at that time.
This year's April 15 and May demonstrations stunned the Chinese leadership and the world at large. Both the student demands and the socioeconomic context of this year's protests were very different. In the beginning of 1989, social and economic conditions were deteriorating. The annual inflation rate since 1988 has been above 30 percent (and 50 percent in some key cities); many consumer and staple goods (such as pork) were in short supply and had to be rationed--a marked contrast with the early 1980s when such goods were abundant. Official corruption in the form of bribery, blackmail, kickbacks, hoarding, and speculation had mushroomed. Public opinion polls throughout 1988 and early 1989 consistently showed that the No. 1 political issue is official corruption and the No. 2 issue is the decay of public morality.
Long road, longer march
Moreover, since Deng repressed the student demonstrations in 1986-87, he has displayed continued opposition to further political reforms. Many conservative figures were elevated to top positions in the party and the government. The euphoria surrounding the party's 13th Congress in 1987, at which political reform was put on the agenda, quickly turned into despair among Chinese intellectuals and students as Deng repeatedly stressed the undesirability of democracy in China and the superiority of authoritarian government for developing countries. Most Chinese intellectuals and students felt they could no longer harbor any illusions about democratic reforms under Deng's regime.
If the 1986-87 demonstrations were viewed as political aberrations (and to a certain extent they were), the student demonstrations of 1989, in retrospect, were clearly inevitable. Indeed, though few had predicted the exact timing, magnitude, and impact of the student
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