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The Challenge of Sino-Soviet Detente
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15978 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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7 / 1989 |
2,628 Words |
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Donald S. Zagoria
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The new détente between the Soviet Union and China, symbolized by the mid-May summit meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese communist leader Deng Xiaoping, raises three questions: What has brought it about? What are its limits? And what are its implications for the United States?
Changing Soviet policies toward China have been one factor instrumental in bringing about the new détente. Gorbachev has shown more flexibility in dealing with China than did any of his predecessors. For one thing, he accepted in principle the Chinese position in the dispute over the Amur River border: namely, that the main channel should be taken as the Sino-Soviet boundary. This concession led to a revival of border talks, which had been suspended for many years, and has raised the possibility of a break-through in the border dispute. Gorbachev has also made systematic concessions on China's three declared obstacles to normalization of Sino-Soviet relations by withdrawing from Afghanistan, promising to withdraw 200,000 troops from the eastern USSR, and pressuring Vietnam to leave Cambodia. The Soviet leader has also said that the USSR would pull three-quarters of its troops from Mongolia. Thus, in terms of the long-standing border dispute and the security environment, there has been a substantial easing of tensions because of changing Soviet policy.
Breathing space
A second factor instrumental in bringing about the Sino-Soviet détente is China's changing view of the Soviet Union. From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, China regarded the Soviet Union as both the greatest and most imminent threat to its security. In more recent years, China has concluded that the Soviets require a long breathing space in international affairs to deal with their internal problems. Beijing thus sees a diminished and less pressing Soviet threat.
Meanwhile, the ideological factor in Sino-Soviet relations has greatly diminished since Mao Tsetung's death in 1976. In Mao's day, the Chinese criticized the Soviets for practicing "revisionism" and "social-imperialism," and the Soviets accused the Chinese of "dogmatism" and "ultra-leftism." Now both countries are becoming more pragmatic in their search for a viable, non-Stalinist model of socialism.
Both sides have powerful motives to continue the process of easing tensions and normalizing relations. So long as Moscow and Beijing are led by reformist leaders, each believes that its most urgent priority for the next decade or more is to modernize and reform its economy. This requires a peaceful international climate, reduction of forces on the border, and transfer of resources from the military to the civilian sectors of the economy.
Both countries also hope to increase their flexibility and maneuverability in the great power triangle that includes the United States. Gorbachev hopes to distance China from the United States and to increase Soviet influence in Asia in order to weaken American prestige and power there. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, after meeting with the Chinese foreign minister last December, said that the philosophy of "blocs" is becoming obsolete and that thought should now be given to eliminating military-political alliances. And Soviet commentators never tire of pointing out the ways in which Soviet and Chinese foreign policy positions coincide with each
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