Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan strongman with a messianic mission, continues to confound U.S. policymakers. Since time immemorial, the Libyan chieftain has been a thorn in the side of both fellow Arabs and Americans. An adventurer without scruples, he has supported terrorist and liberation forces worldwide, his most recent venture being the supply of advanced weaponry to the Irish Republican Army, which has launched murderous attacks against British forces in Northern Ireland and NATO Europe.
For the Reagan administration, the Qaddafi performance has been particularly galling. Since early 1981, Qaddafi has been viewed as public enemy number one. This led to the Gulf of Sidra incident in mid-1981, in which two Libyan aircraft were downed by U.S. Sixth Fleet F-14s, and Qaddafi's decision to form a defensive alliance with Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen, directed against the United States and its allies in northeast Africa.
The record of U.S.-Libyan relations has reflected undisguised animosity over the past eight years. The Reagan administration has responded with military support for the government of Chad and encouragement of Egyptian contingency plans to dispose of the Qaddafi regime. After these efforts misfired, former CIA Director William Casey subsidized sundry Libyan exile groups in an effort to overthrow the regime. Finally, in April 1986, after a series of military incidents and terrorist attacks, the president authorized bombing attacks against Tripoli and Benghazi.
Nevertheless Qaddafi survives, despite the perception by the Reagan administration that the Libyan colonel is not in a strong position at home or abroad. Washington acknowledged his weakened position in January 1988 with the announcement that the colonel no longer posed a serious threat to his North African neighbors. On the other hand, the State Department announced that U.S. policy was dedicated to the goal of isolating Qaddafi, politically and economically, in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.
Over the past year, there have been a series of debacles for Qaddafi that, according to some specialists, produced a remarkable change in his behavior. These have been reflected in the policy area, where the most significant changes since 1987 have been the following:
·Withdrawal of the bulk of regular Libyan forces from the Egyptian border and diplomatic "feelers" intended to improve relations between Cairo and Tripoli;
·Consultations under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the purpose of mediating the Libyan-Chadian dispute over control of the Aouzou Strip;
·Overtures from Tripoli for a political marriage with Algeria, accompanied by hints that other North African states could be invited to adhere to the union should in materialize; and
·Dramatic breakthroughs, underscored in frequent press reports, to restore diplomatic and economic ties with the government of Tunisia, frayed in 1985-86 as a result of a public dispute with Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba.
Not to be overlooked have been measures by
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