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The Arab Moderates: Crucial to U.S. Objectives
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15636 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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2 / 1989 |
3,760 Words |
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Michael Sterner
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Last July 18 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in a step he described as more "deadly than drinking poison," announced that Iran was agreeing to a cease-fire in its eight-year war with Iraq. For the moderate regimes of the eastern Arab world, the conflict had posed one of the most serious threats they had ever faced, and the cessation of fighting--on terms that made it clear Iran had not prevailed--caused a collective sigh of relief to go up in these capitals.
The threat posed by the conflict was not merely one of armed aggression against the territories and economic lifelines of the Persian Gulf states. The greater threat--and one extending to a wider arc of Arab states--was that an Iranian victory would have changed the balance of power in the Gulf region and given new impetus to Islamic extremist movements throughout the Middle East.
The outcome of the war has been a vindication of the steadfastness of the Gulf Arab states, of U.S. policy toward this regional conflict, and of collaboration between the Arab moderates and the United States to protect shared interests. It has given the Gulf Arabs greater confidence in the loyalty of their diverse populations, and it has stripped away some of the mythology of the past--for example, the belief that the governments of the Gulf would face serious internal repercussions if they permitted a U.S. military presence on their shores or in their territorial waters. More broadly, it has given the moderate and pro-Western Arab regimes breathing space to tackle pressing economic and political problems at home. They now can do so, facing an external environment that poses fewer immediate threats but that will still be complex and challenging.
New Balance Of Power
It remains to be seen how durable the Iran-Iraq cease-fire will prove to be. In the months that have elapsed since the cease-fire, there has been very little progress in resolving any of the underlying issues through negotiation. For the time being, however, a deliberate decision to resume hostilities does not appear to be a realistic option for either side. Both Iraq and Iran were exhausted by the war, and while this may be more immediately apparent in Iran, the genuine outpouring of relief in Iraq when the cease-fire was announced makes it clear that a decision to resume fighting would be politically unpopular even if the leadership in Baghdad should want to take it.
But from every initial indication, the negotiations are likely to be difficult and protracted. Iraq believes it won the war, and it appears determined to extract the fruits of victory at the negotiating table. Iran, with its armed forces demoralized and its economy in shambles, is in the weaker position, but it is not at all clear that it feels itself so weak that it is prepared to grant the kind of concessions Iraq is demanding. The basic equation between the two sides may be that while both need a cessation of fighting, neither needs a formal peace treaty so badly as to give major ground on the fundamental issues. And even if agreements were to be achieved, prior pacts have been torn up so many times by these two countries that it would be imprudent to place a great deal of confidence in any new set of solemn undertakings.
Such a no-war, no-peace situation, although having elements of risk, would not be totally displeasing to the Gulf states.
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