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Filling the Holes in the Deal
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15634 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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2 / 1989 |
1,001 Words |
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Michael Johns
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There are few foreign policy developments that seem to generate more support than when sworn enemies of our nation put their names to treaties with the United States. In the rather unique case of the recently signed agreement between Cuba, South Africa, and Angola, the United States is not a signatory, but the agreement is being met in certain corners with similar levels of ecstatic praise. The day following the signing of the protocol in Brazzaville last December, the New York Times reported in a lead news article that the agreement, orchestrated largely by Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, represented "a major foreign policy success."
This support is extremely premature, and the agreement is far more dangerous than its proponents seem to realize. The Angola/Namibia accord may turn out to be the successful diplomatic initiative that some analysts are hailing it to be: The 52,000 Cubans in Angola may depart on schedule; Namibia may achieve genuine democracy and independence; and Jonas Savimbi's 13-year struggle for a democratic Angola may be advanced.
But there is a very real possibility--even a probability--that it will go the other way. Should the agreement succeed in bringing the Soviet-backed Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) to power in Namibia and consolidating the Marxist-Leninist MPLA regime in Angola, Crocker's "major foreign policy success" may actually represent nothing less than the greatest diplomatic coup for the Soviet Union in the past decade. With the consolidation of the Soviet bloc in southwestern Africa, the Soviets will have altered entirely the balance of forces in one of the most strategically important regions in the world.
For the past 13 years, thousands of brave Angolans, led by Savimbi, have fought against a Soviet-backed, totalitarian government, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which acceded to free elections in 1975 and then never delivered. The MPLA and its allies in Havana have demonstrated consistently that they care nothing for the value of their word; if they feel that violating the Angola/Namibia accord will serve their interests without resulting in damaging ramifications, they will violate it. There are no two ways about it.
As a result, verification and compliance mechanisms become critical for an effective agreement. But on this score, the fox has been allowed to guard the chicken coop. The Cubans and the MPLA have signed a separate agreement between themselves that includes details of the Cuban troop withdrawal and its verification. This bilateral agreement will be overseen not by Western democracies, but by the United Nations.
When one considers the many other problems with the Angola/Namibia settlement, one must ask whether this agreement should really receive U.S. support. These problems include:
·The time schedule for elections in Namibia and the departure of Cuban troops is set entirely in the Cubans' favor. The independence of Namibia is scheduled to begin this April 1, but Cuban troops will remain in Angola until July 1991. Consequently, UN forces will arrive in Namibia, interposing themselves between Angola and South Africa and providing a logistic environment that will enable the Cuban forces to launch a final offensive against the Angola freedom fighters without fear of South
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