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The Challenge of a New Era


Article # : 15141 

Section : CURRENT ISSUES
Issue Date : 4 / 1989  2,502 Words
Author : Fred C. Ikle

       It has become a commonplace to point out that the North Atlantic alliance has outlasted all multilateral peacetime alliances. The alliance, however, is more than a military coalition of 16 independent nations. It is a political ideology translated into reality. In fact, two ideas provide the intellectual foundation of the political-military reality that has now endured for four decades.
       
        Appropriately, one of these ideas has its roots in Europe, while the other originated in the United States.
       
        The European idea is the concept of West European unity that led to the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Community (EC). Motivated by the experience of World War II, the animating idea was to make it impossible for West European nations ever again to wage war against each other. The institutions of unity were several: The WEU was designed to coordinate military matters; the European Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM served to integrate those industries thought to provide the principal tools for waging war; and the EC was chartered to build a single European market as a way of integrating the nations' interest groups and businesses.
       
        The second intellectual pillar of the Atlantic alliance was an American idea--in fact, a response to the lessons learned from America's entry into World Wars I and II: If the United States committed itself in peacetime to defend Western Europe, it would be clear that U.S. forces would be engaged in a war in Europe from the outset. This prospect was designed to deter the aggressor.
       
        These two ideas have survived intact for some 40 years. Indeed, they are thriving today. European unity is being further strengthened by the work now going on in Brussels to remove intra-European trade barriers. And while relative defense burdens are a continuing issue of contention between Washington and European capitals, the commitment of U.S. forces to NATO's defense at the outset of an enemy attack is not.
       
        Public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic continues to support the two intellectual pillars of NATO--West European unity and the trans-Atlantic peacetime commitment for defense and deterrence. For the vast realm of North America and Western Europe, a whole new Weltanschauung has been created and firmly established in the minds of the people. It is inconceivable that Italian forces would again attack France, or that West German soldiers would fight and die to invade Holland. It is also inconceivable that the United States would remain neutral for two years if war broke out in Europe. In short, the history of the two world wars cannot repeat itself.
       
        It is of great value to have solid agreement on these broad principles, which are firmly anchored in public opinion. But ideas alone do not suffice to make a strong alliance. Deterrence depends not only on the idea of a common defense, but also on the reality of military force. It has required a continuing struggle within the alliance to find the budgets for maintaining and training the armed forces and for developing and building tanks, aircraft, munitions, and other military equipment. Moreover, the fielding, training, and equipping of the armed forces of the alliance not only have to be paid for each year out of national budgets, but the allies also have to converge on an overall military posture that is guided by a common
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