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The 'Savior' of the Soviet Union
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16297 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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3 / 1989 |
2,845 Words |
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Gerald Frost
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In dealing with the remarkable chapter in East-West relations that began in March 1985 with the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Western statesmen frequently point to the probable fragility and precariousness of the Soviet leader's position and the possibility of his early fall from power.
Many--and these include former President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher--assume that such an eventuality would be against Western interests. Indeed, the latter has argued that Gorbachev's policy changes are not merely in the interests of the West, but in those of "the whole world." Accordingly, she told reporters that one of Reagan's purposes at the Moscow summit must be to act in such a way as to strengthen Gorbachev's position within the Politburo--a novel ambition for a U.S. leader to pursue at a summit meeting and strange advice coming from one of the West's most visceral anticommunists.
In fact, given good health, the political life expectancy of the Soviet general secretary is probably greater than that of a U.S. president or a British prime minister. Of the seven Soviet leaders who have enjoyed preeminent power, only Nikita Khrushchev was removed, the others having died on the job, and one of them--Leonid Brezhnev--even retained titular authority while brain-dead. However ruthless it may be in other respects, the Soviet leadership cannot be accused of quickly tiring of its leaders.
The belief that Gorbachev may soon be deposed--anxieties that Gorbachev has done nothing to dispel in his talks with Western leaders--may stem from a belief that since Gorbachev's reforms are in some respects like those of Khrushchev's, a similar fate may await him. The evidence of factional infighting under glasnost strengthens this view, as does his failure, thus far, to make an impact on the all-embracing Soviet economic malaise.
It may also stem from the readiness of the Soviet leadership to exploit differences (whether actual or contrived) for their own purposes. For tactical reasons, Stalin succeeded in convincing Franklin Roosevelt that hard-liners might topple him, and during the SALT II negotiations the Soviet leadership tried to persuade Western opinion makers that Brezhnev would be replaced by a more hawkish figure if the United States were not more accommodating.
Moreover, while Khrushchev's attempts to decentralize the economy and to reform agriculture bear some resemblance to the reforms now being introduced, the reason for Khrushchev's downfall may have been caused by more than straightforward resistance to reform. Personal vanity, emotionalism, adventurism, unpredictability, and inability to formulate clear goals may have played just as big a part in Khrushchev's political demise--if the recent account of one of his former close associates, Fyodor Burlatsky, now political editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, is to be believed.
Gorbachev, much more of an intellectual than Khrushchev, would appear to display none of these qualities and to be at least as much influenced by Lenin's theoretical writing--to which he continues to show remarkable fidelity--as by Khrushchev.
If Gorbachev has a mentor in terms of dealing with opposition by amassing more and
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