The aphorism that the use of even minuscule amounts of military force in today's world can have dramatic and disproportionate political consequences was underscored in the Persian Gulf in early July through the clash between the United States and Iran. In the aftermath, Iran Air Flight 655 was accidentally downed and all 290 passengers were reportedly killed.
What happened, why it happened, and what broader lessons and implications can be adduced from this incident are key questions that need to be assessed. Was this, as some assert, a failure of men? Or was this simply a regrettable and tragic accident? Indeed, while all the details may never be fully known, many observers wonders why it was that a billion-dollar-plus Aegis cruiser was on patrol inside the Persian Gulf in the first place.
Although the United States has maintained a Persian Gulf presence since the end of World War II, it was not until 1987 that events produced a dramatic increase in American forces in the region. First, the decision to "re-flag" and escort a handful of Kuwaiti tankers was made principally to prevent the Soviet Union from undertaking that task as well as to repair the damage done to U.S.- Arab relations by the Iran-Contra debacle. Then, after the USS Stark, a guided missile frigate, was accidentally struck by two Iraqi-fired Exocet missiles in May 1987, the United States chose to increase its naval presence in the Gulf to expand the protection of navigation for tankers. Subsequently, ships flying the U.S. flag were also extended this protection.
Iran regarded these U.S. actions as a direct threat, since Iraq and Kuwait were allies in the then eight-year-old war and because, in reality, the United States would be defending ships only against Iranian attack. As the size of the U.S. naval presence increased, Iran obtained "Silkworm," surface-to-surface cruise missiles, each carrying a large conventional explosive warhead, with a range of several hundred miles. At least two Silkworms have been fired at Kuwaiti ships anchored in Kuwaiti waters.
Because the Silkworm flies part of its course at low altitudes, it is relatively difficult to detect and, therefore, to defend against, given the inherent problem of distinguishing between the missile and "sea return" on radar. This reality posed an operational dilemma for the United States. Should Iran choose to attack Kuwaiti tankers under U.S. escort with Silkworm missiles, how could the United States effectively defend against these weapons? The operational choices were to station combat air patrols continuously over the Gulf, a very costly exercise; assume greater risks and take no action; destroy the missiles ashore, which posed special problems; or station its most capable antiair ships in the Gulf. The United States made the latter choice and consequently the USS Vincennes, an Aegis-class guided-missile cruiser, was assigned inside the Gulf.
Standard Defense
About the Vincennes, the Aegis-class cruiser that the U.S. Navy advertises as the most sophisticated and capable surface warship in the world, much is known. The ship is 565 feet in length, displaces about 9,600 tons when fully loaded, and carries a crew of just under 350 officers and men. Its primary air defense capability rests in the Aegis system, which is comprised of the SPY-1 phased-array radar, banks of computers and electronic
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