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Moscow's New Military Doctrine: A Tamer Bear?
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14885 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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10 / 1988 |
3,041 Words |
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Andrew C. Goldberg
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For two generations the glue binding the Western alliance together was the prospect of Soviet invasion. The level of superpower confrontation has eased since the gloomiest days of the Cold War, but massive armies of the two alliances still face off against each other across the East-West fault line in Central Europe. In the minds of many Western civilian and military leaders there remains a strong belief, supported by considerable evidence, that Soviet forces are still configured for a surprise onslaught against NATO defenders.
Changes in Soviet policy, including dramatic new arms reduction proposals, are nevertheless calling into question the traditional conception of an offensively oriented Warsaw Pact. Should this image change, it may take with it NATO's reason for being. The prominent Soviet America-watcher and political flack, Georgii Arbatov, summed up the new Soviet strategy recently: "We are going to do something terrible to you--we are going to deprive you of an enemy."
In May 1987, the Warsaw Pact members announced their "new" military doctrine. Its essence, they claim, is defensive; it eschews a preemptive attack on the west. Furthermore, Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev and others now assert that they are willing to trade away military advantages that create the appearance of an offensive threat. The term strategic sufficiency is now being used by Soviets to describe their deployment of force levels only sufficient to defend themselves adequately, not to attack others. During the past few months, Soviet spokesmen have floated new proposals for deep cuts in conventional forces in Europe, actually acknowledging Soviet superiority in ground forces and offering to trade it away. Indeed, Gorbachev now broadly hints that unilateral Soviet troop cuts may yet ensue.
In the West, where arms control fever and an exhaustion with the Reagan defense buildup are both critical issues affecting U.S. military policy, the changes in Soviet doctrine have tremendous significance. If the Soviets mean what they say, then perhaps an abatement of the military competition is possible, at substantially reduced force levels. If they do not, it is possible that Western leaders may be lulled into false security, perhaps trading away needed military capabilities in the interest of near-term détente only to eventually fall prey to a more serious crisis.
At the moment, there are no obvious modifications in the size of the Soviet forces, their levels of weapons production, or the character of their military deployments. The Soviet armed forces that face Europe are not appreciably different than at any time in the past. Skeptics therefore rightly argue that at the moment there is more style than substance to Soviet policy. Yet informed observers are increasingly detecting signs of debate in the USSR over military policy, and it may be that substantial modifications are yet to come. Moreover, the upcoming conventional arms reduction negotiations in Vienna will show the Soviets on a new peace offensive, offering apparently generous terms for relaxing confrontation in Europe.
If the West is going to come up with any sound options for responding to Soviet military policy, it must have a better understanding of policy concern in Moscow. How are Soviet civilian and military leaders tackling major issues of military strategy and what lies behind their
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