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The Presidential Nomination Process: The Case for a Change
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14404 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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6 / 1988 |
2,496 Words |
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James I. Lengle
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No election matches the suspense and significance of an American presidential nominating campaign. The nation and the world await each week's primary results and delegate totals, and two contenders move a step closer to their party's nomination and to the most important political office on the face of the earth, the U.S. presidency. The suspense and significance of the event, however, are marred by the spectacle of an irrational, unfair, and dysfunctional process.
Nowhere are the combined flaws of the system better illustrated than by Iowa's and New Hampshire's life-or-death grip over the field of contenders. Winning or doing better than expected in these two states transforms unknowns into instant front-runners and generates sufficient momentum either to propel candidates to the nomination (for example, George McGovern in 1972; Jimmy Carter, 1976; Ronald Reagan, 1980) or to sustain them through the remaining primaries (Eugene McCarthy, 1968; George Bush, 1980; Gary Hart, 1984; Michael Dukakis, 1988). Every Democratic and Republican nominee since 1972 has finished first or second in Iowa or New Hampshire. History is repeating itself in 1988 as the two winners of the New Hampshire primary, Bush and Dukakis, appear headed toward party nominations, and the Iowa Republican caucus winner, Robert Dole, emerged as the only serious challenger to Bush.
For candidates finishing third or worse in Iowa and New Hampshire, the race is over just as it has begun for the nation. Of the 28 Democratic and Republican contenders since 1972, 24 were eliminated from the contest shortly after finishing third or worse in these first two states. Of the four who survived the Iowa and New Hampshire veto (George Wallace in 1972, Henry Jackson in 1976, Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988, and Albert Gore in 1988), only Jesse Jackson remained viable to the end.
To confer such power over presidential recruitment on these two states is absurd. First, both states are unrepresentative of the country and of both political parties at-large. For the Democratic Party to legally sanction their privileged status in its rules is particularly irrational because both states have voted Republican in eight of the last nine presidential elections. Moreover, states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey, and California, which are vital to the electoral prospects of both parties, often find themselves with no choice, if the race ends early, or with a limited choice from a menu of candidates served up by Iowa and New Hampshire.
Second, such small states exercising disproportionate influence over presidential recruitment makes a mockery of the notion of popular control, because success and failure in both states in based on so few votes. In 1976, Carter was transformed from dark horse to nominee by appealing to only 34,000 voters (11,000 in Iowa and 23,000 in New Hampshire)--or to fewer voters than in an Arlington County, Virginia, board race. In 1980, Hart was similarly transformed overnight on the basis of five supporters per caucus in Iowa and 38,000 voters in New Hampshire. Meanwhile, candidates slightly less popular in Iowa and New Hampshire are dealt a fatal blow. In the 1980 GOP race, Howard Baker was eliminated on the basis of just seven fewer voters per caucus than Bush. For Democrats to accept a process dominated by Iowa and New Hampshire "bosses" is particularly ironic, because they have spent the last 20 years trying to rid the process of "party bosses."
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