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Introduction: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Age of Gorbachev
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14399 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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6 / 1988 |
1,031 Words |
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Are the United States and the Soviet Union now standing at a historic crossroads? Is it possible that these two superpower adversaries which have contested with each other on every continent in the world for the last 40 years, may be ready to resolve at least some of their strategic and political differences? Are the INF treaty signed in Washington, D.C., last December and this month's Moscow summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev the first steps down the road that leads to true and lasting peace?
Such euphoric questions are being asked in every capital of the world by thoughtful men and women not normally given to euphoria. But the questions are justified. Clearly, Gorbachev is a far different Soviet leader than anyone the West has seen in decades, not just in style, but in substance. Brezhnev would never have suggested pulling out of Afghanistan, let alone setting a timetable to accomplish it. Khrushchev never challenged the nomenklatura as Gorbachev has with his call for a "deep reorganization" of the Soviet economic system.
But caution and suspicion, based on years of often bitter experience, understandably persist. What should U.S. policy be in the age of Gorbachev? This month's Special Reports presents the answers of leading experts in foreign policy, national defense, and economics.
Professor Jerry Hough of Duke University argues that the United States should try to encourage the Soviet Union's "reintegration into the West" and its opening to Western ideas. The United States should attempt to negotiate "meaningful" arms control agreements if Gorbachev "is willing to pay for them." And the United States should abandon a foreign policy of "anti-Sovietism" and substitute a policy centered on economic interests if, as seems apparent, Gorbachev deemphasizes "the military factor" in Soviet policy.
Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is not so sanguine about Gorbachev and Soviet intentions. The United States must not be swayed by rhetoric or dramatic flourishes (such as the release of Andrei Sakharov from internal exile) but must determine to what extent Gorbachev has truly changed traditional Soviet goals. Pfaltzgraff asserts that, so far, the Soviet leader is as committed as were his predecessors to decoupling the United States from Western Europe and the Far East, denuclearizing NATO, strengthening Moscow's military might, and weakening the West through one-sided arms control treaties. Rather than reacting to Gorbachev's initiatives, the United States should take advantage of the very real weaknesses that beset the Soviet system and press for basic concessions such as the removal of the Soviet first-strike capability and for U.S. deployment of a strategic system.
Trade deterrence
There must first be significant political and strategic changes in the Soviet Union, states Professor Henry R. Nau of George Washington University, before U.S.-Soviet trade can achieve meaningful levels. He calls for a policy of "trade deterrence," based on the recognition that the United States and the Soviet Union are adversaries and asserts that East West trade "can never become a substitute for defense." Nau urges the United States to tighten and streamline "strategic controls" while letting nonstrategic trade and joint ventures "emerge at their own pace." We
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