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The Middle East and Soviet Strategy
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14139 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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1 / 1988 |
2,964 Words |
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Avigdor Haselkorn
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In recent years there has been a lot written about "trees" in the Middle East. In contrast, only scant attention has been paid to the "forest" there. Yet, it is precisely the macro-level analysis that suggests that a fundamental shift in the constellation of forces in the region has been under way for some time. The transformation has been mainly the result of local changes to which both superpowers have sought to respond. However, at the moment it appears as if the Soviet Union has a better appreciation of the new circumstances in the area, and recent shifts in its Middle East policy imply that the Kremlin is seeking to adjust to the regional dynamics in order to benefit from it.
Students of international relations have long been preoccupied with assessing the relative power of various countries. A list of indicators of potential power, it is commonly agreed, includes such elements as a country's area, natural resources, population, military posture, and so on. However, in the Middle East--an area of active conflicts--an important discrepancy between actual and potential power has become apparent. Moreover, the relevance of a country's actual power in such a region has increasingly superseded the calculus of potential capabilities. Consequently, ranking local countries in the Middle East according to their strategic significance appears to have less to do with the traditional indices of power.
For example, while Iran under the shah ranked high in terms of both its quantitative and qualitative military capabilities, it was not until the rise of the Khomeini regime that this country emerged as a discrete regional power pole. This happened in spite of the fact that Iran's military arsenal is presently a shadow of its previous size or sophistication. Moreover, Iran's economic condition has deteriorated considerably in comparison with the shah's era. Similarly, Israel cannot be considered a regional superpower if traditional indicators of size, population, natural resources, and so on are used. It is obvious, however, that Israel, despite its self-perception to the contrary, is currently viewed by both friend and foe, in and out of the region, as on a strategic plane distinct from the rest of the countries in the Middle East.
It appears that a major factor in deciding these countries' regional standings is their war records. As a zone of active conflicts, the Middle East's power structure is closely linked to the performance of nations during their "moment of truth"--that is, in war. Thus, the emergence of Iran as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf derives from its ability to roll back the invading Iraqis and to transfer the war into the enemy's territory under adverse circumstances. Again, an Arab army backed by many Arab regimes was unable to defeat a non-Arab nation, even though the objective conditions suggested a quick Arab victory was at hand. Consequently, the standing of Arab countries in the region has suffered--to Iran's advantage.
Similarly, Israel's strategic predominance has resulted from its defeat of a variety of Arab conflicts, irrespective of the objective indicators that suggested the country's power was inferior to the potential of its enemies. Moreover, the significance of a country's war record in determining its relative standing is also evident on the Arab side. For example, the improved performance of the Syrian ground forces in the 1982 war in Lebanon vis-à-vis the Israeli Defense Forces helped boost President Hafez Assad's regional and international
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