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Gorbachev and Stalin's Ghost


Article # : 13969 

Section : CURRENT ISSUES
Issue Date : 2 / 1988  3,571 Words
Author : Herbert J. Ellison

       Mikhail Gorbachev has delivered no more important speech during the nearly three years of his leadership than that to a joint session of the Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Filling four full pages of Pravda the next day, the speech contained major pronouncements addressed to every segment of the Soviet population and to foreign communist leaders, as well as to the leadership and population of the rest of the world. The speech provided an interpretive overview of Soviet history, with special emphasis on Stalin, intended to guide and limit the turbulent discussion of the subject encouraged by glasnost; an evaluation of the achievements and prospects of Gorbachev's leadership (with as much emphasis upon problems and frustrations as on hopes); and an important review of the contemporary international scene and the challenge to Soviet foreign policy.
       
        Press comment at the time focused mainly on the remarks on Stalin, and the meaning of that was widely misinterpreted. In view of major developments since, particularly in U.S.-Soviet relations and arms negotiations, the foreign policy section, which was almost ignored, deserves special attention. So too does the vital connection between Gorbachev's pronouncements on Stalin, perestroika, and foreign policy.
       
        The recommended version
       
        From Lenin to Gorbachev, Soviet leaders have sought to use history as a means of legitimizing both party rule and current policy. Stalin's presentation of Soviet history was very tightly woven, justifying the purge of his political competitors and the vast economic and cultural revolution which he initiated in the late 1920s. Successors who have wished to break from that tradition--notably Khrushchev and Gorbachev--have been compelled to challenge the Stalin historiography, as have intellectuals who sought fundamental reform of the Stalin system.
       
        Stalin revisited
       
        Khrushchev discovered the political risks of de-Stalinization when he faced revolt in Eastern Europe and widespread intellectual dissent at home. And Gorbachev, who has permitted a considerable revival of criticism of Stalin and pressure for rehabilitation of some of his party opponents, has now decided to set the official historiography straight and put limits on a new movement of de-Stalinization from below.
       
        Gorbachev began his speech with an affirmation of the validity and importance of the October Revolution. This is a conventional gesture, yet one that might have been thought unnecessary after 70 years. He then turned to the central concern of the whole first section of the speech; namely, the period of emergence of Stalin's power and the early planning and implementation of Soviet industrialization and agricultural collectivization.
       
        During the past two years, Soviet intellectuals have begun to reexamine this important period, expressing doubts about the wisdom and the necessity of Stalin's choices. Some have hinted that Nikolai Bukharin was not only the innocent victim of Stalin but also the formulator of a scheme for moving forward from the New Economic Policy of the twenties without coercion by stressing economic incentives, especially for the
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