One need have not the slightest sympathy for the Cuban government to believe that the United States ought to begin a process of cautious reengagement with that government. We do, after all, deal with other governments we do not like and with which we disagree strongly, simply because we believe it advances our interests. Why should the same logic not hold for Cuba? If we can negotiate with and have pragmatic relations with the Soviet Union, why not with Cuba? If we can have rather normal relations—despite our differences—with Czechoslovakia, the People's Republic of China, Paraguay, Chile, and South Africa, why should that not be possible with Cuba?
In fact, there are a whole series of problems and disagreements between the United States and Cuba that have been allowed to fester far too long. If the Cubans are prepared to sit down at the negotiating table to address those differences—and they say they are—why should we not put them to the test? Why should the United States hang back—especially since resolution of many of these problems would benefit the United States as much as—or in some cases, more than—Cuba?
Cuba, for example, has emphasized its readiness to negotiate a compensation agreement so that U.S. citizens could be paid for the properties they lost in Cuba in the 1960s. So far, it has been the United States that has shown no interest in negotiating this matter. Does that make sense? The United States is the only country with claims against Cuba that has not reached a compensation agreement.
In the same vein, the United States complains that Cuba is intervening in Central America, yet it refuses to discuss with Cuba even those aspects of Cuba's role that it finds most troublesome. Why? If there are disagreements and conflicts of interest between the two—whether in Central America or elsewhere—they ought to be discussed and aired. The two might even find that their respective positions in Central America are not necessarily irreconcilable. The United States does, to be sure, have legitimate security concerns in Nicaragua. Thus, a rational U.S. objective would be a Nicaragua so restrained by international agreements that it posed no threat to its neighbors, to the Panama Canal, to nearby sea-lanes, or to the continental United States. But such a Nicaragua would be acceptable to Cuba as well. Cuba's principal objective, after all, is the survival of the Sandinista government. In short, there is ample room for an accommodation acceptable to all sides.
As we reexamine us Cuban relations, the central question is not whether we ought to normalize diplomatic relations. That would represent only a symbolic act, with little substantive meaning. Rather, the question is whether we ought to negotiate the problems between the two countries—or at least test Cuba's willingness to negotiate them. That implies a shift from hostile confrontation to diplomatic engagement, but it is not time to make such a shift?
There may have been a time when the old policy of isolation and confrontation made eminent sense. In 1961, we still hoped the Cuban revolution was a passing phenomenon and that our containment policy would hasten its demise. Certainly we wished to do nothing that might prolong it or give it greater legitimacy, as negotiating with Havana would have. But 30 years have passed, and it is obvious that the Cuban revolution is not a passing phenomenon. Hence, we may as well make up our minds to deal with
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