On its 30th anniversary, the Cuban revolution has reached a critical stage. Internally, persistent structural problems in the economy, low prices for Cuba's export products, and an inability to break away from economic dependency on the Soviet bloc are forcing a reexamination of basic goals. The deepening economic crisis has produced a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation in the hope of stimulating productivity. While rejecting perestroika and glasnost, Fidel Castro has returned to the failed paths of the past, insisting that Cubans should work harder, sacrifice more, and expect less in the years ahead. Pessimism and cynicism have replaced revolutionary fervor. For the foreseeable future, Cubans can expect more austerity—with greater food and consumer goods rationing—and therefore harder times.
Externally, Castro remains a willing ally of the Soviet Union. While frictions have developed since Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power, the Soviet Union's influence on the conduct of Cuba's foreign policy remains strong, and Cuba's solidarity with the Soviets is one of the cornerstones of Cuba's foreign policy. Without abandoning his commitment to anti-Americanism and internationalism, Castro has become more selective in supporting revolutionary groups in Latin America and elsewhere. He has expanded ties with the new Latin American democracies and has tried to project a statesmanlike image. He also seems willing to negotiate a solution to the Angolan conflict on his own terms, while expanding Cuba's military presence and commitment in that country.
Mild overtures from Castro toward the United States are encouraging those in this country who believe it is time for a rapprochement with Cuba. As he has in the past, Castro seems willing to negotiate with the United States. What is in question, however, is not whether to negotiate but rather Castro's willingness to make meaningful concessions to the United States—concessions concerning Cuba's relationship to the Soviet Union, the Soviet military arsenals and presence on the island, Cuba's fomenting of revolutionary and terrorist insurgencies, and the involvement of Cuba's military forces in Africa.
Castro is not ready or willing to make these concessions. It is interesting to note that his overtures to the United States are usually followed with the by now standard qualifier: "Since certain things are sacred—independence, the country's sovereignty, its revolutionary principles—its political and social systems cannot be renounced. Whoever destroys them will have to fight us." On July 26, 1988, on the 35th anniversary of the Moncada attack that launched his struggle for power, Castro reemphasized his commitment to revolution and rejected any possibilities of change. "Cuba," he said, "will never adopt [the] capitalist method, style, or philosophy. We are proud of our ideological purity."
Yet, recurrently, U.S. administrations have hoped for an accommodation with the Cuban revolution. Castro has periodically, especially prior to U.S. elections, extended ostensible olive branches to the United States, only to retract them. The expectation remains, however, that somehow a negotiated settlement can be found in order to contain Castro's internationalism and the accelerating currents of instability and conflict in Central America and thus relieve the United States of the difficult choices that it faces in responding to these developments. Optimistic appraisals of the possibility of a "deal" with Castro have also been encouraged to a large
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