The polarized debate over Central America illustrates the breakdown of the postwar bipartisan consensus over U.S. foreign policy. For the past eight years, a Republican president has been pitted against congressional Democrats, most spectacularly over aid for the Nicaraguan rebels, but over others issues as well. Inside the National Security Council, by Constantine Menges, shows that an equally important, but lesser-known battle over Central America raged between a group of Reagan loyalists on the National Security Council and high-ranking officials at the Department of State.
Menges has been pejoratively dubbed a "Reaganaut" by his critics. This refers mainly to his passionate anticommunism, which his detractors regard as excessive and hopelessly passé in this post-Vietnam era of détente with the Soviet Union. But as Menges makes clear, his anticommunism is an outgrowth of his strong commitment to democracy: He believes people prosper most, both materially and psychologically, under democratic rule, and assumes that democratic governments are likely to be U.S. allies and to further the security interests of the United States.
These values and beliefs place Menges squarely in the camp that has been labeled the "ideologues," as opposed to the "pragmatists,'' in the battle over Central American policy that was fought within the executive branch of the two Reagan administrations. The battle is not yet over. In a temporary lull, it will resurface shortly as the new U.S. president tries to come to grips with the ongoing crisis in Central America. For this reason, it is important to understand the nature of the struggle that Menges vividly describes.
Ideologues vs. pragmatists
The ideologues start from the assumption that the Sandinista rulers of Nicaragua are, and have always been, communists. As such, they are committed to helping Marxist guerrilla groups in neighboring countries seize power. The combination of the Sandinistas' "export" of their revolution and the relative weakness of the new Central America democracies that are their targets could lead to a domino effect—in other words, to the establishment of communist regimes throughout the region. Such a development would threaten Mexico, whose government has been severely weakened since the onset of the debt crisis in August 1982. Mexico's presidential election of July 1988, which occurred after this book went to press, injected still more uncertainly into the country's political future.
The best way to avoid a communist Central America, according to the ideologues, is to force the Sandinistas to democratize. A democratic Nicaragua would be neither militaristic nor communist, since the majority of Nicaraguans do not support such policies. U.S. aid to the rebels fighting the Sandinistas is crucial for achieving democracy in Nicaragua, since the Sandinistas make concessions toward greater political pluralism only when they are forced to do so. At the same time, the United States must work to strengthen democracy in the rest of the region.
Menges refutes the popular charge that the ideologues want a military, as opposed to a negotiated, solution to the Central American conflict. Instead, he argues that a negotiated solution is desirable, provided that it requires the democratization of Nicaragua and is enforceable and verifiable. Otherwise, there will be no real peace.
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