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Character and a Life Worth Living: A Reply to Davies
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14635 |
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Section : |
MODERN THOUGHT
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5 / 1988 |
2,492 Words |
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Morton A. Kaplan
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If Christie Davies' article "What Prevents Life from Being Worthwhile?" is taken as a descriptive account of the moral beliefs that are prevalent in contemporary liberal democracies, I would have very little to question. If, however, it is taken as a moral prescription for contemporary society, I have serious reservations. Character is what makes a life worth living, and Davies' prescriptions would likely erode character. The key feature of Davies' article is the statement that, unlike totalitarian societies which prescribe how individuals should be happy, even enlightened authoritarian societies allow each to be happy in his own way. Each can decide what makes life worthwhile. The only limits placed on such choices is that they not hurt others and that they not irreversibly limit the freedom of the individual. Thus, for instance, it is permissible to become a monk, but not to be emasculated.
I do not wish to quibble over apparent exceptions--for instance, that Davies would permit sex change operations that involve emasculation. I know also that Davies does not argue against firm commitments or lifetime vocations but rests his case on the argument: "Flagging sentiment cannot be reinforced by coercion, and it has become more difficult for an individual or an institution to call on the power of the state to uphold a particular view of what makes life worthwhile." It is easier, Davies says, to agree on what prevents life from being worthwhile. Thus, we have extensive welfare arrangements as safety nets against accident, disease, or want. Here the common denominator is "a kind of short-term negative utilitarianism by which we promise to reduce the pain, harm, or suffering of a particular group of individuals in the immediate future." Hence, we permit abortion, which reduces the pain of the pregnant woman, and, except in a few countries, we have eliminated capital punishment, which irreversibly harms the criminal. On the other hand, the fetus is only a potential human being and the victim is already dead. Thus, they are only abstract. (I must admit to some puzzlement over the sequitur, for I can accept many of the safety nets without arriving at Davies' conclusions.)
When the Nazi war criminal Herbert Kappler, old and terminally ill with cancer, was snatched from his prison hospital and allowed to die at home, it would have been easy to approve the act if all we took into account was limited to the consequences for Kappler and his relatives. But the decision tore at the hearts of those who had suffered in death camps. It undermined their sense of human dignity. When a man who has raped, tortured, and killed numerous young girls receives only limited punishment, many of the victims' relatives will think that society has placed only limited value on the girls' lives. Other young girls may feel that the value of their lives is diminished if even those who are caught and convicted of such heinous crimes receive only limited punishment. Is this abstract?
John Donne spoke truly when he said, "Ask not for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee." Each of these decisions is an expression of what society values. It enters into our self-images, our sense of worth, and our conception of what society should be. Where would we be as a society if no one were willing to sacrifice for the common good? If no one cared about the world we bequeathed to "abstract" future generations? Yet, whatever qualifications Davies may make--as when he states that "none of this implies that the individual cannot or should not undertake firm commitments or enter lifetime vocations"--lasting commitments are discouraged by the position he
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