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Soviet Target: The Indian Ocean
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14614 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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5 / 1988 |
2,846 Words |
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Robert J. Hanks
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Under the astute leadership of its former commander in chief, Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov, the USSR's "sea power of the state" was transformed from little more than a coastal defense force into a first-magnitude, blue-water navy. Gorshkov also understood the necessity for the Soviet Union to acquire access to overseas bases if the navy he was crafting hoped to replicate an already demonstrated American capability for extension of sea power--thus, national political influence--to saltwater and land regions distant from the homeland.
Throughout his three decades in power, Gorshkov kept this reality uppermost in his mind. Today, his successor--Adm. Vladimir N. Chernavin--is pursuing the same objective with matching vigor. Like his predecessor, he is doing so in the vast expanse of the strategically important Indian Ocean.
To comprehend recent developments in this area, one must glance into the rearview mirror of history.
Traditionally, Russia's search for warm-water southern ports to supplement frequently icebound counterparts along the USSR's Siberian coastline has been evident. While this historic aim might remain on Moscow's international agenda, growth of the Soviet fleet has permitted the Kremlin to pursue an alternative approach: forward deployment of its naval forces, supported by bases and facilities on foreign soil. In this regard, Moscow has increasingly targeted the Indian Ocean during the past 25 years.
Its opportunity was provided in January 1968, when the Labor government announced plans to withdraw all British military forces from "east of Suez" by the mid-1970s, a time frame subsequently accelerated to 1971. Scarcely a month after the British declaration, a Soviet naval squadron entered the Indian Ocean for a four-month cruise. The five-ship force called at ports in India, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and South Yemen. The importance of this deployment was underscored by Gorshkov himself, who flew to Madras and Bombay in India to greet the ships. From this moment forward, Soviet-Indian naval cooperation began to blossom. Later in the year, other Red warships followed in the wake of that pioneering squadron. It is fair to say that in 1968, the Soviet navy came to the Indian Ocean to stay.
As the years passed, Moscow further capitalized on the British withdrawal, acquiring base rights or access to supporting facilities in all of the foregoing countries except Iran and Ceylon. Elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, the Kremlin obtained visitation rights for its warships. With the USSR's omnipresent fishing fleet serving as the thin end of an entering wedge, routine calls by men-of-war wearing the hammer and sickle became a common occurrence around the shores of the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf.
The origins of Moscow's present regional ambitions can be traced to 1958, when a leftist, pan-Arab group seized power in Iraq. In the watershed year of 1968, however, the Ba'ath Socialist Party took complete control of that country, and close ties to the USSR began to flourish. Soviet men-of-war were soon accorded access to Basrah. Subsequently, Moscow undertook construction of an Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr. Fronting directly on the Persian Gulf, this new base would allow Baghdad's warships to evade Iranian surveillance as they sailed south from Basrah along the Shatt al-Arab (the confluence of the Tigris and
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