It has been the dream of nearly all who have guided the destinies of great states and empires that economic strength and military might should complement each other in a self-reinforcing cycle, by which each would grow eternally greater in its service to the other. But the world history of the last five centuries demonstrates that no great state or empire with even pronounced economic or military advantage has managed to maintain its superiority, much less increase it, on anything but a relatively temporary basis.
In The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Yale historian Paul Kennedy examines this paradox of world politics on the basis of what he sees as the permanent dilemma of statesmen of all time: the need to maintain an acceptable balance between the imperative of military strength and that of a sound economic base sufficient to bear the costs of defense without sacrificing levels of growth adequate to guarantee the strength of the economy as a whole. Kennedy's 620-page study immediately drew the interest of journalists, as well as those who by profession think globally about power politics. Indeed, it has become one of this year's most talked-about books. But why, considering the scholarly nature of the text, all the attention?
THE WORLD & I asked three experts to respond to this question, as well as other issues Kennedy raises. First, diplomatic historian Amos Perlmutter explains (p.376) how a learned tome has become a best-seller due to the "hidden message" of Kennedy's overextension thesis, which opponents of the Reagan administration's defense policy were longing to hear. Next, John Gagliardo, a specialist in early-modern European history, examines the application of Kennedy's
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