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Afghanistan: The Case for Continued U.S. Aid
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14533 |
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CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
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3 / 1988 |
3,667 Words |
| Author
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Sean D. Naylor
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Eight years after Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul, the Soviets have become bogged down in a vicious war of attrition with the Afghan mujahideen, partisan guerrillas whose hatred of the invaders is matched only by their fierce allegiance to the Islamic faith.
Faith alone, however, could not have sustained the guerrillas during their jihad (holy war). The mujahideen have also been the recipients of what has been described as the most expensive American covert aid program ever (with the exception of the Laos campaign). By the end of 1986, the CIA had channeled an estimated $1 billion worth of arms and ammunition to the guerrillas.
Many observers believe the increased effectiveness of the Afghan resistance led the Soviets to seek a negotiated end to the conflict. After protracted UN-sponsored talks, the Soviets have said they hope to withdraw their troops in 1988--if the United States cuts off its aid to the freedom fighters. Secretary of State George Shultz has indicated the United States may do just that, even before the final Soviet withdrawal is completed.
The U.S. aid program in Afghanistan has always been controversial. CIA sources refer to the covert operation as "daring" and "topnotch" and point to the Soviets' inability to completely subjugate the Afghans as evidence of the aid's effectiveness. Independent observers and mujahideen sympathizers, however, have criticized the program as being inadequate and inefficient, and they have accused the CIA of supplying the guerrillas with only enough aid to fight and die--not enough to win.
In January 1980, within weeks of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter began the flow of American military aid to the mujahideen. Since then, all U.S. covert supplies to the Afghans have followed the same path: through Pakistan (the United States' foremost ally in the area and the obvious choice as conduit for the covert aid) to the city of Peshawar, 20 miles from the Afghan border. In Peshawar the aid is distributed to the seven Afghan resistance parties headquartered there.
The first military aid sent to the guerrillas consisted of Soviet-style weaponry bought by the CIA from the Egyptians and Chinese. Most of these weapons were either versions of the AK-47 Kalashnikov assault riffle, popular with guerrilla forces the world over because of its sturdiness and durability, or other more obsolete pieces of communist bloc hardware. Despite U.S. aid, however, during the early years of the war most mujahideen were still using ancient .303 Lee Enfield rifles, prevalent in the bustling arms bazaars of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), or weapons captured from the Soviets and their Afghan communist puppets.
This situation had begun to change by 1982. Upon taking office, President Reagan urged an increase in military assistance to the Afghans, and over the next year, increasingly sophisticated weapons started to find their way into the hands of the mujahideen. Chief among these was the RPG-7--a rocket-propelled grenade launcher that has become the primary antiarmor weapon of the Afghan resistance. Along Afghanistan's winding mountain roads, accurate RPG hits on the first and last vehicles of a Soviet convoy can stall a Soviet advance for hours and set the stage for a successful mujahideen
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