THE JAGUAR SMILE: A NICARAGUAN JOURNEY
Salman Rushdie
New York: Viking, 1987
171 pp., $12.95
NICARGUA: REVOLUTION IN THE FAMILY
Shirley Christian
New York: Random House, 1986
450 pp., $10.00
TURNING IN THE TIDE
Noam Chomsky
Boston: South End Press
300 pp., $10.00
A debate over who lost Nicaragua is sure to follow the Reagan administration's departure from office, if it does not erupt during the presidential campaign. It will probably focus on the administration itself, in the first place, and the Congress, in the second. The reason for that order is obvious: The reason for that order is obvious: The executive proved unable to frame a Central America policy that was viable and win a consensus for it among the public (and, for that reason, in the Congress as well). The Congress then seized the opportunity to make policy, as it has frequently tried to do since Vietnam. However, after faulting Reagan for a bad policy, it presented no alternative - and likewise failed to lead. The end result has been the tragicomic Iran-Contra hearings on Capitol Hill. A third culprit, however, and one that history may decide is as much, or even more to blame, is the American intelligentsia.
The large and still growing literature on Nicaragua, which this writer has combed over an extended period of time, is conspicuous for its lack of solid analysis or creative ideas. This is true of academic authors. And it is true of intellectuals identified with the Right and the Center - sad, in view of the fact that Reagan was "their" president and his administration provided the best possible environment for developing a coherent policy for both Nicaragua, a challenge in itself, and for Central America-Mexico, the even greater challenge.
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America came closest to creating a viable policy. Central American nations are notoriously poor and are precariously dependent on one or two products. A Central American policy must taken seriously the region's need for economic aid planned over enough years to allow for stable development. This the commission understood; it recommended multiyear funding and an approach to the region as a whole that would have maximized development by eliminating national trade barriers. Still, the commission's own leadership, starting with chairman Henry Kissinger, did not take its recommendations seriously enough to fashion them into an explicit policy and then lead the effort to persuade the U.S. public that here was our best opportunity to set Central America on the path to democracy and at the same time protect our security interests. Kissinger became the commission chairman almost accidentally - he is, after all, our preeminent Europeanist.
Other concerns
In reality, the brightest minds have never given themselves to the Nicaragua issue. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, who
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