Until Ferdinand Marcos left the Philippines last year for a prolonged Hawaiian vacation, most American officials though his campaign against the communist New People's Army (NPA) was a sputtering failure. Marcos' replacement, Corazon Aquino, they thought, would change all that.
The communists would soon be on the defensive, they reasoned, because many rebels would lose heart once a popular and reform-minded government was in place. And for those who stubbornly fought on, a revitalized Filipino army would take care of them.
Now, these officials are not so sure.
Eighteen months after the transition from Marcos to Aquino, that expectation seems naïve. In fact, the NPA insurgents are stronger than ever, and the end of the 18-year-old communist war is nowhere in sight.
Little-known a few years ago, the New People's Army of the Philippines believes it can achieve "strategic stalemate" in 1992. Strategic stalemate means the NPA can no longer be defeated militarily. That leaves Manila a Hobson's choice of accepting the communists as a permanent part of the political system or, worse, facing eventual defeat. According to NPA strategy, this will be followed by a strategic offensive.
Is it an idle threat? Those who know the NPA best believe its leaders are serious, and with good reason.
Today the NPA operates in perhaps 70 of the country's 74 provinces. That's 10 more than two years ago. In some, the communists are not in virtual control, they are in control. The NPA collects taxes, performs local public services, and otherwise moves freely about. The army and the police constabulary stay out.
The communist army has an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 combatants and is growing. Compared to the armed forces total of some 70,000 fighting men, (see sidebar) that is a highly unfavorable ratio for the government's forces. Experts think it may only get worse in the coming years, not better.
Intricate web expands
The bean count of men under arms, however, is only part of the problem. The NPA and its sponsor, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), never believed that power can simply be won at the business end of a gun barrel. As a consequence, unlike numerous pro-Castro guerrilla and terrorist groups in Latin America, the Filipino rebels believe their military arm must be matched with an equally powerful political one. In that the CPP succeeded.
Over the years, the CPP spun an intricate web of political fronts that not only provide a mass base and respectability (while observers debate once again whether the communists are really in control or not), but funds as well, often obtained from the West.
In contrast to the NPA's iron determination, neither President Ferdinand Marcos nor Corazon Aquino had met the growing threat with a comprehensive plan of action as yet. Words, not even money, are all that countered the problem. Even now a lackadaisical air hangs over
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