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Buttressing the COCOM System
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13126 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
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11 / 1987 |
1,908 Words |
| Author
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Stephen D. Bryen
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The multilateral Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM), based in Paris, has as its central purpose protecting Western technology so that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries cannot use the technology for strengthening their military programs. While COCOM has had its ups and downs since its creation in 1949, we are now on the verge of determining whether COCOM can take the actions needed to assure Western security in the 1990s or will have to be replaced with something new.
COCOM is an entirely voluntary organization comprised of the NATO members (minus Iceland) and Japan. Indeed, there have been times when COCOM's very existence was not confirmed by the countries participating in the system. Even today, COCOM's headquarters are off-limits to visitors, and COCOM delegates all work under the cover of other organizations in Paris, including embassies and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The reason for all the mystery about COCOM and its operations is, most certainly, political. COCOM was started by NATO as an economic blockade of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was moved out of NATO's headquarters and off to Paris because its activities seemed more economic than military in orientation. As the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe became a reality, COCOM activity continued, but its political character and its orientation shifted.
Western countries, for various reasons, were accepting the legitimacy of Eastern Europe's integration into the Warsaw Pact military system. But, it was understood, steps had to be taken to make sure that weapons and critical goods were not shipped to any of these countries. COCOM was the means to coordinate such a NATO effort, but it was directed to do so in a nearly sub rosa fashion. The result was that COCOM nearly went underground. It was not given a formal charter; no written agreement of any kind was proposed or signed; and it was hidden away in a dark building that belonged to the U.S. Embassy in Paris (but located half a mile away from the main embassy complex).
COCOM's mission also changed in two senses. It became even more voluntary than it was originally, mostly because the participating countries desired flexibility in their political ties to the Eastern countries. COCOM, therefore, began to evolve a list of goods that contained levels of control. Countries were permitted to determine for themselves whether goods were to be shipped, without being obliged to coordinate in a formal way with the other countries. Likewise, the list of controlled goods was narrowed and trade with the Warsaw Pact picked up considerably.
COCOM also evolved in specifying its objectives. The idea of economic blockade was dropped, and COCOM was redirected to target only those goods that might contribute directly to the military effort of the Warsaw Pact itself.
Goods were divided into three lists: goods that were clearly weapons (controlled absolutely to the Warsaw Pact and mainland China); goods that were atomic energy related (initially controlled absolutely, but no longer); and goods that had a dual character (hence the term dual use). This list (called the International List by COCOM and the Commodity Control List by the United States) is where the action is - and the
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