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Where the U.S. Navy Is Headed
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12505 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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7 / 1987 |
4,425 Words |
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Thomas H. Moorer and Clarence A. Hill, Jr.
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A new secretary of the U.S. Navy in the person of ex-Marine James Webb has replaced John Lehman. Meanwhile, a Congress dominated by the opposition party in both houses has taken charge of the defense budget. While these events portend some differences in approach to the Navy's rejuvenation, there are ample reasons to believe there will be no major change or reversal in the Navy's course. These reasons are grounded in certain strategic fundamentals that remain constant despite changing personalities and political perceptions.
Unlike many Third World nations, which often invest in the latest technology for a show of strength and modernity, U.S. Navy leaders planning for the future must assume that every piece of equipment for which they are granted congressional authorization and appropriations will someday be used in battle. They are also aware that the officers and men that man the fleet must be trained to fight to win for the nation's very survival.
From a hard-headed perspective, then, there is no such thing as a "peacetime" Navy. Nor is there any validity in a strategic paper chase that assumes a potential enemy will agree to fight only on our terms. Planning for a "short war" can be fatal. In 1973, the Israelis planned for a short war and almost had one when they ran out of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. It was not what they had envisioned.
To provide a basis for a rational discussion of the U.S. Navy's future, one must have a benchmark from the past and an understanding of the present. This understanding must include national objectives, strategy, and the equipment available to carry out that strategy. The Navy is a highly technical service, and the long lead time required to construct ships and produce naval weapons demands prewar preparation.
The stated national security objectives of the Unites States are to, inter alia, deter attacks on the United States and to defeat them if deterrence fails; deal effectively with terrorism; assure control of the seas and space; provide for unimpeded access to world markets and raw materials; prevent Soviet domination of Europe and Asia; and strengthen our ties with other nations of the world.
By an accident of geography, the USSR, along with those countries contiguous to and allied with it, was initially forced to adopt a "land," or "continental," strategy. By the same token, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were faced with no alternative to maritime strategy.
The facts are that neither strategy - land armies on the continent of Europe or naval forces in open ocean areas - can operate to the exclusion of the other to secure victory in any outbreak of hostilities. But clearly from its position, the United States has no other choice than to put major resources in its maritime forces.
The Navy's functions
It is only by a combination of land and sea forces that a Soviet-initiated war on NATO could be won by the West. (In World War II, for example, it was the transportation of American trucks by sea that gave the Russian army the mobility required to defeat the Germans, while it was the food also transported by sea that sustained their population.) Further,
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