Now that a number of months have passed since the United States launched its raid on Libya in April 1986, it is increasingly clear that the attack was a political success and that critics' predictions of dire consequences have not, and very probably will not, come to pass. There has been no surge of Libyan-backed terrorist activity in the wake of the attack; Libyan and Syrian activism declined markedly, reinforced by Soviet counsel that Tripoli and Damascus lay low for a while. Colonel Muammar Qaddafi has not been strengthened either internally or in the Arab world, but has been weakened at home and abroad. Otherwise there would not be such unprecedented, open murmurings against the colonel at home nor would the Israeli-Moroccan and Israeli-Egyptian summits have taken place. Even U.S. allies in Western Europe have begun to act somewhat more responsibly against terrorism and those states that support it - no small accomplishment given European economic stakes and thus European inclinations to avoid all offense in its relations with the Arab world.
There was, however, another facet of the attack - the strictly military aspect, which, in the light of its success, has received surprisingly little mention. On the contrary - despite the deserved praise showered on the mission by Pentagon spokesmen, or perhaps because of it - critics have argued that U.S. aircraft did not perform well. Some critics contend that if one adds up the number of FB-111 aircraft that failed to make it beyond the Azores to the target area (6), the number that made it to the target area but failed to attack (5), the number of aircraft that attacked but attacked ineffectively or hit the wrong targets (5), the one aircraft that was lost (probably not to enemy fire), and the one aircraft that failed to return directly to base, then one can conclude that only about 25 percent of the aircraft (6 of 24) performed acceptably. Critics admit that perfect dependability is impossible, particularly in a mission flown over such distances and with nonmilitary constraints imposed on the use of ordnance. But 75 percent - or even 50 percent - is not an acceptable failure rate. Imagine, they say, what a failure rate of that magnitude would mean in a real war.
In this age of questioning authority, when the self-adulation of Pentagon spokesmen is rarely taken at face value, many people are inclined to accept the critics' judgment, especially in the context of seemingly ceaseless, scandalous revelations about waste, fraud, and mismanagement in the Pentagon. When Congressman Berkley Bedell, D-Iowa, can take a repair kit that cost of the Navy $10,168.56 and purchase the same 21 tools at two Washington, D.C., hardware stores for $92.44, it casts a long shadow in most people's minds over the credibility of Pentagon statements in general. To those weary patriots among us who in private soliloquy beseech the hero suddenly and impossibly brought low, saying, "tell me it ain't so" - good news! It ain't so, at least not this time. This becomes clear when the particulars of the raid are held up to scrutiny.
First of all, it was impossible for the United States to gain any measure of strategic surprise against Libya. In the period immediately prior to the raid, the press had revealed that U.S. intelligence had established undeniable proof of Libyan involvement in the Berlin discotheque bombing; that the USS Coral Sea was being kept in the Mediterranean beyond its normal tour of duty; that Vernon Walters, U.S ambassador to the United Nations, was touring Western European capitals in search of support for a U.S. strike; and even
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