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Syria After Assad


Article # : 12209 

Section : CURRENT ISSUES
Issue Date : 2 / 1987  3,206 Words
Author : Daniel Pipes

       Recent photographs of Hafez Assad, the strongman of Syria, show him gaunt and sickly. Indeed, Assad has been ill since late 1983, and his health, judging by pictures, shows a steady deterioration. This raises questions about Syria when Assad dies. Who follows him and what are the consequences?
       
        For Syrians, it is a question of particular importance. Assad has transformed their government. When he came to power in 1970, the country had experienced two decades of almost annual coups d'etat. No ruler had established himself securely and the country suffered from a weak international position. Assad ended this instability and weakness, imposing strong leadership through a police apparatus, providing continuity of rule, and making Syria a leading actor in Middle East politics.
       
        From what one can tell from the outside, Assad has anointed no successor; when he dies, a number of leading figures will contest the right to rule. If this occurs, there is a good chance that his whole apparatus of repression will collapse. Syrian politics would then revert to their old ways, as officers stage coups and factions proliferate.
       
        Alienating the Sunnis
       
        An understanding of the political dynamics of Syria - and the likely prospects after Assad - means grappling with that country's ethnic politics. Other considerations - economics, conflict with Israel, ties to the Soviet Union - matter too, to be sure, but not so much as the fact that Assad and almost all of the present leadership are members of a small and traditionally scorned religious minority, the 'Alawis. Their rule is profoundly resented by the majority Syrian population, the Sunni Muslims. A serious weakening of the regime could lead to a reassertion of Sunni power and a transformation of Syrian politics.
       
        Sunnis make up about 90 percent of Muslims around the world and almost 69 percent of the population of Syria. In addition, they have a long tradition of political power; Sunnis expect to rule. When they do not, trouble usually ensues.
       
        Traditionally, Sunnis ruled in Syria. For a long time, they formed the landlord class and owned the great commercial enterprises. Sunnis held 90 percent of the administrative posts in the years before 1914 and, despite efforts to disenfranchise them by the French imperial power, they virtually maintained their power until independence in 1946. With independence, they inherited the government. Through subsequent changes in government and shifting ideologies over the next 20 years, the conservative and wealthy Sunnis of Damascus and Aleppo controlled the capital.
       
        The 'Alawis took power in 1966; the impact of this event can hardly be exaggerated. An 'Alawi ruling Syria was an unprecedented development that shocked the majority population who had monopolized power for so many centuries. It meant the end of the urban Sunni elite's domination and the reversal of many deeply held assumptions and long-standing relationships. The rise to power of this despised minority signaled, as Michael van Dusen has written, "the complete social, economic, and political ruin of the traditional Syrian political elite." Van Dusen does not exaggerate when he calls this event "the most significant political fact of twentieth-century Syrian history and politics."
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