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NATO Must Rethink Its Role to Survive
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12204 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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2 / 1987 |
2,183 Words |
| Author
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Sir Alfred Sherman
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When NATO was founded in the early postwar period, it was justifiably Eurocentric. The main Soviet threat was to mainland Europe and Scandinavia. The Berlin blockade was a recent memory. The North German plain seemed the most vulnerable sector. The countries of the northern and southern flanks needed political and military reassurance against Soviet attempts to pick them off one by one. Reinforcement from North America in the case of need was the main strategic and logistical problem, and there was a consensus that the alliance possessed the naval, air, and ground forces necessary, provided technical problems were solved.
In 1950, the wider world framework seemed stable. "Containment," as outlined by George Kennan in 1947, was accepted as the order of the day. The politics of NATO members' relationship with the rest of the world seemed safe to leave in their individual hands. Coordination of the NATO powers' extra-European policies as a function of the defenses of Europe and its North Atlantic lines of communication was never attempted, let alone achieved. Member went their own way with their various world and regional interests and responsibilities, real or imaginary; their own way with their various world and regional interests and responsibilities, real or imaginary; their regional groupings; involvement in the United Nations, Commonwealth and other distractions; and their attempts to buy popularity from all and sundry.
Since then, the international framework within which NATO must operate has changed beyond all recognition. The Soviet forces and their allies have leapfrogged round the world, outflanking Europe and the North Atlantic corridor.
When NATO was created, its members controlled the whole of the continent of Africa. Though Egypt, Liberia, and Ethiopia were nominally independent, Egypt had a large British garrison in the Suez Canal Zone, Liberia was part of the U.S. sphere of influence, and Ethiopia was strongly oriented toward its British liberators. Britain had a dominant position in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Pakistan was an ally. Britain had its outposts in Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong. Australia and New Zealand were firm allies. The Western Hemisphere was securely protected by the Monroe Doctrine, however interpreted. NATO could therefore concentrate on Europe and its environs.
Diverging policies
Realities were soon to change, but the mood of complacency outlasted them. From the early 1950s, it became apparent that even the minimal degree of unity of purpose shared by NATO's members in their policies toward the North Atlantic area did not extend beyond it. This was made obvious in the case of China. The Atlee government recognized the Peking regime according to its diplomatic practice, whereas the U.S. government not only refused to grant recognition, but barred any contacts whatsoever. Other European countries veered toward the British position. The ramifications of this basic difference of strategy were to color the allies' attitudes toward the Korean War and later even more strongly to Vietnam.
Policies toward the Middle East also began to diverge. Early success in forging a common approach, symbolized by the Anglo-French-U.S. tripartite agreement on arms sales to participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, crumbled. American opposition to the Anglo-French
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