From the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair to the bravado of its Persian Gulf patrols, U.S. policy in the Gulf has raised serious questions about the credibility, indeed the incredibility, of U.S. foreign policy. Analysts and pundits have focused on the issue primarily in terms of image management, but the issue of impact is a far more serious matter.
Since the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, the United States has maintained an official policy of neutrality. Its only direct involvement, aside from calls for an end to the conflict, was to supply intelligence of questionable quality to the Iraqis. Throughout the war's seven years, the United States was actively involved in "Operation Staunch," the campaign to block Western arms sales to both Iraq and Iran. The campaign involved applying diplomatic pressure on foreign governments to persuade them not to get involved in the conflict. Staunch was also part of a larger U.S. policy to isolate nations accused of backing terrorists.
Iran, whose radical supporters in Lebanon are holding American hostages, was the target of most of the U.S. efforts. This policy was warmly received by America's Arab allies, as it was designed to choke off Iran's supply of arms and thus increase security in the region. In fact, in October 1986, less than one month before news of U.S. arms sales to Iran became public, Secretary of State George Shultz, in a speech to a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), criticized the Soviet Union for not doing enough to stop arms shipments to Iran. Shultz said, "The Soviets have not acted as forcefully as we in moving to block arms to Iran....We wish they would do more."
As has now been made public, the story was actually far different. At the same time that Washington was actively attempting to block the supply of arms to Iran, it was selling arms to Iran. Aside from the sheer hypocrisy of such a situation, the sale challenged America's position as a world leader.
The excuse that the sales were made to free hostages held no water in the Arab world. Instead, America's Arab allies believed that the United States was hedging its bets in the event of an Iranian victory. To the Arab world, the arms sales meant the United States was choosing sides in the war. Jordanian Foreign minister Taher Masri, an outspoken critic of the affair, said: "Such dealings will do tremendous harm to Iraq and the outcome of the war." Masri went on to state a popular belief in the Arab world - Israel was the motivating force behind the sales. "It's the U.S. in the arms of Israel again," he said.
Jordanian anger over Israel's involvement is understandable when one considers that Israeli pressure played a large role in scuttling a U.S. proposal to sell $1.9 billion worth of arms to Jordan in 1985.
The general reaction in the Arab world to the Iran-Contra affair is that the United States has destroyed its credibility in the region. U.S. prestige had already begun to decline after it bombed Libya in April 1986 for its alleged sponsorship of terrorist activities in Rome and Berlin. In both cases, Syria, not Libya, was later found to have been behind the incidents. Moreover, when Vice Adm. John Poindexter's proposed disinformation campaign against Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi became public, American activities and purposes came under increasing scrutiny. The arms sales,
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