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Misleading Parallels: Nicaragua and Vietnam
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11773 |
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Section : |
Editorial
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| Issue
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4 / 1987 |
4,262 Words |
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Morton A. Kaplan
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Parallels are being drawn by many in Washington between Nicaragua and Vietnam to argue for a "hands-off" policy with respect to Nicaragua. Among the incorrect parallels are the arguments that as in Vietnam our involvement will necessarily escalate in the absence of congressional curbs, that the domino effect has been proven wrong, and that we can come to terms with Nicaragua as we did with China. Although the Vietnam case will be reconsidered from a number of vantages in this issue of THE WORLD & I in the Currents in Modern Thought section, in this editorial I will argue that these proposed parallels are incorrect and suggest other parallels that are more relevant. I shall indicate briefly at the conclusion why the policy of ending support for the Contras is inconsistent with an attempt to find a satisfactory accommodation with the Soviet Union.
Although Santayana said that those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it, the more usual case in international relations is that of learning the wrong lesson from history. For instance, administration officials and congressional leaders, many of whom did not believe that China would intervene in Korea, constrained policy on Vietnam in the belief that otherwise the Chinese would intervene.
In fact good analysis would have avoided both mistakes. An Egyptian friend who had asked me to oversee the Yemeni delegation to the United Nations told me during the debate over crossing the 38th parallel in 1950 that American intelligence had been shown to the Egyptians that proved the Chinese would not intervene. Yet the information from Indian Ambassador Panikkar about Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's firm assertions, the movement of Chinese armies toward the Korean border, and the temporary weakness of the American forces should have convinced our leaders that the Chinese were almost sure to intervene.
Deciding it had learned its lesson, official Washington agreed that China would intervene in Vietnam if we threatened the North. Yet, at the Hudson Institute, Herman Kahn, Frank Armbruster, Ed Stillman, and I were confident the Chinese would not intervene. Whereas Korea fronted on Manchuria, the most heavily industrialized area of China, with very good logistics, Vietnam bordered on an undeveloped Yunnan with abysmal logistics, problems that persist to this day. The Chinese clash with India in 1962 had already shown how few troops and resources China could dispose in its southwest region. Furthermore, Operation Killer had chewed up the best Chinese divisions in Korea, and Mao was not about to risk a repeat of that result. If this was not enough, Mao had told Edgar Snow in October 1965 that if there were war with the United States, China would win with guerrilla tactics--that is, in its own territory. Although a small number of officers in China disagreed with Mao, there never was any risk that they could overcome the overwhelmingly negative considerations. By assuming that parallels could be drawn easily, the entire U.S. establishment fell prey to a new error.
It is not surprising therefore that the wrong parallels are being drawn in the case of Nicaragua and that some of the correct ones are ignored. One incorrect parallel argues that Vietnam disproves the domino effect. Certainly many thought that much of Southeast Asia would come under communist control if the North won, and this has not been the case. However, certain facts should be kept in mind. Both the proximity of communist China and the continuation of civil war in Cambodia keep Vietnam's
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