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India and Pakistan: Getting Down to Brass Tacks
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12953 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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5 / 1987 |
2,271 Words |
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Sumit Ganguly
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The dust clouds have just begun to settle in the trackless wastes of the Rajasthan desert in the wake of postindependence India's largest peacetime triennial military exercise. However, as the eerie stillness returns to the parched plains, many questions continue to haunt the minds of those interested in the future of the troubled subcontinent. Though the Indian military exercises, Operation Brasstacks, and the Pakistani response seemed to be pushing the two countries toward yet another war, the chances of one actually occurring are remote. To fully comprehend why an outbreak of war is unlikely, what politico-military forces underlay this exercise, and what the events bode for the security of the region, it is necessary to delve into the historical background of the Indo-Pakistani relationship.
Batter thy neighbor
India and Pakistan emerged as independent states in 1947 from the breakup of the old British India. Despite last-minute British attempts at forging some element of unity between the two principal protagonists of Indian and Pakistani nationalism, the Congress Party and the Muslim League, the two groups chose a parting of the ways. Furthermore, the British transfer of power to the two nascent states was neither bloodless nor tranquil. In fact, shortly after the transfer of power the two states went to war over the state of Kashmir.
Nominally independent, but actually under British tutelage (under the aegis of the doctrine of paramountcy, by which a native prince recognized the supremacy of the British Crown), Kashmir had a Hindu monarch, a Muslim-majority population, and a common border with Pakistan. As the leaders of the Pakistan movement had sought to create a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia and had carved out a state on the basis of Muslim-majority areas, they placed an irredentist claim on Kashmir. The Congress leadership, which had sought to promote a secular and democratic nationalism, felt compelled to challenge this claim. If they did concede the Pakistani claim on Kashmir, it would fundamentally undermine the secular basis of the Indian polity.
United Nations mediation brought the war to a close but could not address the underlying issues that had precipitated the conflict. The two states were to go to war again in 1965 and 1971. The latter war divided Pakistan into the two states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Indian perceptions and analysis, this effectively undercut the Pakistani claim on Kashmir. After all, if Pakistan could not hold on to a segment of its own population (bound by religious ties), what right did it have to seek to incorporate a portion of another country?
In addition to the damage that Pakistan suffered to its ideological raison d'etre, the 1971 war placed India in a militarily hegemonic position on the subcontinent. In subsequent years, the Indian leadership buttressed this position through significant arms acquisitions from a variety of foreign sources, but primarily from the Soviet Union. India's position was further reinforced through the explosion of an atomic device in 1974. Thus, between the breakup of Pakistan and the subsequent Indian military preeminence, a form of hegemonic stability emerged in South Asia. Though galling to the Pakistani leadership, this stability dramatically reduced the prospects of war in South Asia - at least until December 1979.
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