|
|
Public Relations Meltdown: The Two Disasters at Chernobyl
| Article
# : |
10998 |
|
|
Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
|
| Issue
Date : |
6 / 1986 |
2,764 Words |
| Author
: |
Kirsten O. Lundberg
|
The Soviet Unions' world reputation has just suffered a disastrous blow from the fallout--both radioactive and political--of the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown. Faced with worried demands from the world community for information and cooperation, the Kremlin stonewalled with cursory and contradictory statements. Soviet spokesmen lied, denied, and accused.
The Western public has found it difficult to understand why the Soviet Union would be so secretive regarding a matter of grave concern to its own citizens as well as to the rest of the world. Why wait two days to announce the accident? Why issue no warnings, in Kiev? Why turn down worldwide offers of assistance.
The dilemma with which the Soviet leadership always struggles when it is thrust into the limelight of world publicity is that the Western world, unlike the Soviet population, demands information quickly. Faced with an information vacuum, Western media speculate as to what might be happening. As generations of Western correspondents in Moscow have complained: "If they don't give us access to accurate information, then they have only themselves to blame if reports are not always correct." With each ensuing crisis, the Soviet Union is learning more about how to manage information to its own best advantage. But is has a long way to go.
In fact, the Soviets have rarely been so forthcoming so quickly with information on a disaster. Ironically, by their own standards their performance regarding Chernobyl has been exemplary. To understand why this is so, it is important to remember that most accidents in the Soviet Union are never publicized. In fact, there is a strong possibility that, had radioactivity not spread to Western Europe, the accident at Chernobyl would have remained secret. But the radioactive cloud did get to Sweden, and the Kremlin had to deal first with assessing the physical damage at the plant, then with releasing very bad news. What's more, the news had to be tailored for both domestic and foreign consumption.
No government wants to cause panic through injudicious release of information. In the West, however, the common practice is fully to inform the public in a crisis so that rumors do not run wild. In the Soviet Union, panic is avoided through news blackouts. The Soviet public does not expect explanations from its leaders, but, unfortunately for the Kremlin, the foreign public does. In this case, foreign nations felt they had a right to full disclosure.
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had in recent months painstakingly constructed a "new era" Soviet image of openness and reasonableness. At the 27th Communist Party Congress in February, he committed himself to greater honesty in the domestic press: "Under all circumstances, communists, always need the truth." Perhaps he raised Western expectations too high. Certainly he did not mean a drastic switch to a Western-style glut of information in the event of a catastrophe. But many Westerners thought he did, and much of his image-building work has been undone in just a few days.
Moscow realized within days of the accident that foreign perceptions of its handling of the explosion were turning into a public relations disaster. Foreign scientists, doctors, and government officials criticized the Soviet failure to protect both other nations and its own people adequately. Soviet spokesmen complained about
...
Read Full Article
|
|
