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Deciphering the Summit Dialogue
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10701 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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Date : |
1 / 1986 |
1,961 Words |
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Morton A. Kaplan
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The 1985 Geneva Summit between the leaders of the world's two most powerful nations, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, culminated several years of preparation on both sides.
The actual results of the summit cannot be evaluated from a single perspective. In order to effectively examine the events leading up to and following the meeting, several experts have lent their talents to analyzing and commenting on the summit talks.
Dr. Morton Kaplan, Chicago University Political Science professor, details the underlying meaning of the summit parleying.
Dr. Albert Weeks, New York University Political Science professor, examines the political motivations of the Soviets in coming to the summit.
Dr. Ray Cline, who attended the 1955 summit in Geneva, expresses caution about any great expectations of peace and progress, pointing to the historical record.
The summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev clearly was a public relations success. The two leaders smiled at each other. Their wives were beautiful and charming. The gaffe by presidential chef de cabinet, Donald Regan, that the wives of the leaders were interested in styles and not in throw weights, added charm and piquancy to the meeting.
The summit was more than a public relations success, but it produced less than some commentators, although not the president himself, suggested. It was important because the leaders of the two major nuclear powers must be able to talk and negotiate with each other if we are to reduce the danger, slight though it may be, of a horrendous nuclear war. Marginal though it may be, the two leaders may have been able to reduce misperceptions by the other; and this is not without some importance. However, to analyze the effects of the summit, it is important to look at the specific agreements and lack thereof.
President Reagan stressed his commitment to the strategic defense initiative and General Secretary Gorbachev did not storm out in a huff. But neither was there a meeting of minds on the issue. Gorbachev stressed that there would be no agreement on missile reductions without an agreement to renounce defensive installations and hinted that the Soviet Union could install such a system faster and more cheaply than the United States, something that failed to surprise those who believed that the Soviet Union already had installed most of the features of a nationwide defensive system.
The two leaders agreed to work toward a 50 percent reduction in missile forces but could not agree on which missiles should be included in the reduction. This disagreement appears to be basic because the Soviet Union refuses to make cuts in its heavy ICBMs--that provide its 11.9 to 4.4 million pound throw weight advantage over the United States and a consequent first-strike capability against the American missile forces--and the United States will not agree unless they include them.
The two sides agreed not to seek military superiority, but do not agree on what constitutes superiority. They agreed that
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