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The Grand Strategy Behind Renewed Sino-Soviet Relations
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10357 |
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Section : |
Current Issues
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12 / 1986 |
2,052 Words |
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Richard C. Thornton
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By now it should be obvious to even the most casual reader that the Sino-Soviet conflict is over. The big question is: How far will the rapprochement go between the two communist giants? Are we witnessing the first steps toward a return to the alliance relationship of the early 1950s, or is each power using an improvement in relations as a means of achieving other objectives? Is it a reversal of the early 1970s when the United States held the center position? Then, as the United States moved toward rapprochement with China, Moscow was forced to improve relations with Washington to avoid being odd-man out. Today, China appears to hold the center position. Are Chinese leaders calculating that improved relations with Moscow will force concessions from Washington?
Current Soviet Strategy and China's role
Soviet grand strategy since 1979 has been focused on the Middle East and designed to prepare for the moment when Iran could be brought into its political orbit--either as a client state or as a "neutral." Indeed, Iran, in the throes of a long and inconclusive war and on the precipice of internal instability, presents Moscow with a greater geopolitical opportunity than did the prospect of communist revolution in China 40 years ago. And the rewards of success are potentially greater. If Moscow could bring about a pro-Soviet reorientation of a post-Khomeini regime and thereby obtain leverage on global petroleum flows (for such a reorientation would impact upon the entire Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia), the energy underpinning of the U.S. position in both Europe and Asia would be fundamentally damaged. Moscow would move into the position of energy broker for those dependent upon Middle Eastern petroleum and potentially become the hegemonic power in the hemisphere.
Today, after six years of fighting, the denouement in the conflict between Iran and Iraq appears to be at hand. Iran has mounted what it claims will be the "final offensive," the third such final offensive in the past four years. What makes this one different is not only its scope and magnitude but the strategic conditions surrounding it, especially in the U.S.-Soviet balance and in the internal conditions in Iran and Iraq. Tehran has massed upwards of half a million men for the offensive and the logistical support to sustain a long attack on multiple fronts. Internal conditions in both Tehran and Baghdad are such that defeat of either party will result in the overthrow of the defeated leadership.
Most important, however, are the strategic conditions impinging upon the conflict. Soviet strategy toward the war has been comprised of three basic stages. First, Moscow sought to extend the conflict to a protracted stalemate that would exhaust Iranian power, making it more susceptible to manipulation. That is why Moscow has supported both sides in the conflict. Secondly, the Soviets have attempted to construct a geopolitical position of strength around Iran that would enable Moscow to prevent any possible interference from the United States when the decisive moment arrives--thus, the intense Soviet position-building effort in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Syria and Libya, and the deployment of SAM 5 anti-aircraft missiles there as well as other military equipment. Thirdly, when Iranian power is exhausted and when Khomeini dies, Moscow will be in position to encourage the emergence of a "friendly" Iran or trigger sympathetic elements to attempt a takeover. Outright invasion is unlikely.
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