There are many different types of moral analysis or moral theory, but they tend to fit into two broad categories: deontological ethics and the ethics of consequences. In deontological ethics, one is obliged to do that which is right regardless of motives or consequences. The ethics of consequences, on the other hand, evaluates moral behavior by its expected outcome.
In my writing in the field of moral theory, I have argued that neither approach can be used exclusively. If one distribution of the funds would save a hundred lives and another distribution would save a thousand lives, surely the moral decision would be to make the second distribution: that is, to give overriding weight to the consequences of the decision. On the other hand, in combat, for instance, we expect soldiers to come to the aid of their comrades even though they forfeit their lives in doing so.
No society could survive severe environmental or social disturbances in the absence of at least some deontological rules. For instance, during the water shortage in New York City in the 1960s, when the mayor asked the citizens to take baths rather than showers, violation of that edict by a particular person in the privacy of his own home would cost others only an infinitesimal amount of water. Clearly, in the absence of a moral rule, those who preferred showers would take showers. If many citizens had that preference, however, the water supply would have been threatened. Only a deontological moral rule can prevent this.
An interesting thing about deontological moral rules is that they do not need to be obeyed without exception to be effective. Violators can be punished or ostracized. Indeed, if perfect acquiescence were required for deontological moral rules to be effective, it is likely that none would survive. No known social system has failed to throw up deviants; and though few, if any, deontological rules can survive widespread deviancy, there is abundant historical evidence that limited deviancy does not seriously impair their perceived imperative status.
There is, of course, a tension between an ethics of consequences and a deontological morality. Who would wish to obey a deontological rule against lying, or even murder, if by lying, or committing murder, one could save the world, or even a city, from total destruction? On the other hand, who would wish to live in a society in which everyone calculated the value of shifting partners? What would a business partnership be worth if each day the partners calculated the value of cheating each other? What would an academic institution be worth if a teacher failed an excellent student because he expected him to become a thief? In short, morally intelligent people wish to live in a society in which deontological moral rules are observed, at least for many forms of activity, even when they conflict with individual advantage. They want to live in a society with deontological rules because they believe it will be a good society and not merely for the rules themselves. In this limited sense, even deontological rules are balanced by consequences, although not by narrow, instrumental consequences.
I am aware that there is a long tradition that would analogize deontological moral rules to so-called existential 'reals': for instance, the belief that atoms and antelopes exist absolutely. It would be too much of an aside for me here to attempt to show that both positions assert a
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